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ADDICTION-INFORMED IMMIGRATION REFORM
Rebecca Sharpless*
Abstract: Immigration law fails to align with the contemporary understanding of substance
addiction as a medical condition. The Immigration and Nationality Act regards noncitizens
who suffer from drug or alcohol substance use disorder as immoral and undesirable. Addiction
is a ground of exclusion and deportation and can prevent the finding of "good moral character"
needed for certain immigration applications. Substance use disorder can lead to criminal
behavior that lands noncitizens, including lawful permanent residents, in removal proceedings
with no defense. The time has come for immigration law to catch up to today's understanding
of addiction. The damage done by failing to contemporize the law extends beyond the harms
of unwarranted family separation due to the deportation or exclusion of people who suffer from
substance use disorder. Holding noncitizens to an archaic standard threatens our civic and
political identity as a diverse and democratic country. The bigger the gap between
contemporary mores and immigration law and policy, the harder it is for U.S. citizens to
develop a civic and political identity that is free of ethnic and racial animus. Double standards
for citizens and noncitizens create cognitive dissonance, leaving society vulnerable to
discriminatory or stereotypical views to justify the differential treatment. This phenomenon
not only harms noncitizens but thwarts the formation of a national civic and political identity
free of ethnic and racial bias. This Article proposes and explains the legislative reforms
necessary to remedy the current state of immigration law's treatment of people with substance
use disorders.
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INTRODUCTION
Shifts in social mores and advances in scientific understanding can be
powerful drivers of evolution in the law. As the United States Supreme
Court has recognized, "new insights and societal understandings can
reveal unjustified inequality... that once passed unnoticed and
unchallenged."'
But immigration law-largely insulated from
constitutional oversight-lags behind.2 One important example of this
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __ 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
2. Under the plenary power doctrine, immigration laws and policies are not subject to regular
constitutional scrutiny. See generally EMER DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. II, ch. VII, § 94,
at 309 (1758) (discussing how the power to exclude is inherent in sovereignty); Catherine Y. Kim,
PlenaryPower in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2017) (noting how federal
courts are less likely to abide by the plenary power doctrine in cases involving decisions of agencies
rather than Congress); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration,
Congress,and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1994) (analyzing trends of federal courts
when adjudicating constitutional challenges in immigration cases); Stephen H. Legomsky,
Immigration Law and the Principleof PlenaryCongressionalPower, 1984 SuP. CT. REv. 255 (1984)
(discussing how "phantom constitutional norms" govern statutory interpretation in immigration law
and that the plenary power doctrine should be "reassess[ed]"); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of PlenaryPower:Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation,100
YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990).
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misalignment of law and contemporary understanding is immigration
law's conception of substance addiction and related behavior as moral
failings that justify the exclusion and expulsion of noncitizens. Since the
earliest federal immigration laws, people viewed as "chronic
alcoholic[s]," "habitual drunkards," or drug addicts, and people convicted
of drug use or addiction-related drug sales have been denied citizenship,
deported, and excluded.3 As society has moved away from understanding
addiction as a character flaw and toward a medical understanding of
addiction as a mental disorder with physical manifestations,4 immigration
law and policy have remained firmly rooted in anachronistic social and
scientific norms. This Article makes the case for contemporizing
immigration law's view of addiction. The argument is both descriptive
and normative. As a descriptive matter, the prevailing understanding of
addiction is that it is a disease from which people can recover.5 This
Article's normative claim is that a diagnosis of "substance use disorder"
should mitigate moral judgments about addiction and related behavior,
such as drug possession.6 Immigration law does not reflect these views,
but it should.
From colonial times to the present day, we have excluded and expelled
people whom we have dubbed undesirable or unworthy.7 For almost a
century before the federal government passed immigration laws, towns
and states regulated their borders based on health, morals, and
economics.8 Early federal statutes banned entry of people considered
"convicts," sex workers, "idiots," "lunatics," and persons deemed likely
to become a public charge.9 From 1882 to 1943, race-based laws excluded
and expelled Chinese immigrants. 1° More recently, the Trump
Administration has banned the entry of noncitizens who are not lawful
3. The phrase "chronic alcoholism" appeared as a statutory ground of exclusion in the Immigration
Act of 1917 and was repealed in 1952. Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917) (repealed
1952). The other terms, however, appear in the current version of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. See infra section II.
4. See infra section II.
5. Id.
6. See AM. PSYCIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
483-84 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V] (defining "substance use disorder").
7. See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION (2007). For a critique of
immigration policy premised on perceived worthiness, see Muneer I. Ahmad, Beyond Earned
Citizenship, 52 HARV. C.R.-Civ. LIBERTIES L. REv. 257, 273-90 (2017); Elizabeth Keyes, Defining
American: The DREAMAct, Immigration Reform and Citizenship, 14 NEv. L.J. 101, 141-55 (2013).
8. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
9. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477; Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
10. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Star. 58, repealedby Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat.
600.

1894

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1891

permanent residents from certain majority-Muslim countries, citing
national security concerns. 1 Under the plenary power doctrine established
in the late nineteenth century to exclude Chinese immigrants, the
sovereign authority of the United States to regulate its borders without
limitation has been "a proposition... [not] open to controversy."12
Although more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has found a place for
some limited constitutional restraints, at least with respect to noncitizens
already inside the United States, immigration law remains marked by
constitutional exceptionalism."3 In other areas of the law, constitutional
challenges--enabled and supported by social movements-have
facilitated the law's incorporation of modem understandings and popular
opinion. 14 By comparison, the U.S. Constitution has left immigration law
relatively untouched.
Due in part to this lack of constitutional oversight, immigration law has
lagged behind developments in science, social norms, and medical
understanding, including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) published by the American Psychiatric Association. 5
Even though the DSM removed "homosexuality" as a mental disorder in
11. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017); see also Exec. Order No. 13,780,
82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017). The latter order was upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
12. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889); see also supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
13. Compare Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (finding that "indefinite detention of
[lawful permanent residents] would raise serious constitutional concerns" and invoking the canon of
constitutional avoidance), and Landon v. Plasenica, 459 U.S. 21, 35 (1982) ("[T]he courts must
evaluate the particular circumstances and determine what procedures would satisfy the minimum
requirements of due process on the reentry of a permanent resident alien."), with Trump v. Hawaii,
576 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018) ("[F]oreign nationals seeking admission have no
constitutional right to entry."), Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S.__, 135 S.Ct. 2128, 2138 (2015) (finding no
constitutional violation when spouse of U.S. citizen was issued denial of visa stating no reasons),
Demote v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (holding mandatory detention of criminal resident aliens
pending their deportation hearings does not violate due process), Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 79899 (1977) (noting discrimination based on sex in immigration statute constitutional because
Congress's power to expel or exclude noncitizens is largely immune from judicial scrutiny), and
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 768-70 (1972) (holding that denial of entry to noncitizen
seeking to engage in academic exchange did not violate First Amendment rights of those seeking to
communicate with him).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744,773-75 (2013) (holding that the ban on samesex marriage is an equal protection violation); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (holding
that prohibition on abortion is unconstitutional); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
(requiring the government to provide defense attorneys for indigent defendants in criminal
proceedings); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1961) (invalidating state laws prohibiting interracial
marriage); Brown v.Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that segregation in public
schools constitutes illegal racial discrimination).
15. See generallyDSM-V, supra note 6.
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1973, gay, bisexual, and transgender noncitizens were denied entry into
the United States until 1990.16 Immigration law dubbed them excludable
as "afflicted with psychopathic personality." 17 Until 2010, HIV-positive
status was grounds for exclusion as a communicable medical condition
despite widespread understanding of how the disease is transmitted.18
Immigration statutory provisions continue to employ archaic language
and concepts, including outdated gender stereotypes, distinctions between
children born in and out of wedlock, and proof of marriage consummation
as a requirement in some circumstances. 9

16. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a) 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (1990); AM.
PSYCIATRIC ASS'N, HOMOSEXUALITY
CHANGE
IN
DSM-fI,
6TH

AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISTURBANCE: PROPOSED

PRINTING,
PAGE
44,
at
1
(1973),
https://pages.uoregon.edu/eherman/teaching/texts/DSM-L-Homosexuality-Revision.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TS3S-2HZJ] ("Homosexuality per se is one form of sexual behavior and, like other
forms of sexual behavior which are not by themselves psychiatric disorders, is not listed in this
nomenclature of mental disorders.").
17. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 212(a)(4) 66 Stat. 163, 182, amended by
Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(4) (1988) (repealed 1990)); see also OSCAR M. TRELLES & JAMES F. BAILEY,
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACTS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, 19501978, at 361-63 (1951) (recounting the homophobic remarks during congressional hearings for the
1952 Act); see generally Shannon Minter, Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S.
Immigration Law: PenalizingLesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 771 (1993).
18. Congress attached a rider to an appropriations bill in 1987 that added being HIV positive to the
grounds upon which noncitizens could be excluded. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-71, § 518, 101 Stat. 391,475; see also 133 Cong. Rec. S6943-01 (1987); LORi SCIALABBA,
DONALD NEUFELD & PEARL CHANG, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., PUBLIC LAW 110-293,42
CFR 34.2(B), AND INADMISSIBILITY DUE TO HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS (HIV) INFECTION 1
(2009), https://www.imniigrationequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/USCIS-nov-29-2009hiv-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5MY-EGP2]; Juan P. Osuna, The Exclusionfrom the UnitedStates
of Aliens Infected with the AIDS Virus: Recent Developments and Prospectsfor the Future, 16 HOUS.
J. INT'L L. 1,7-12 (1993).
19. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2012) (requiring blood relationship with father, financial affidavit
of support for children born out of wedlock abroad); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68-71 (2001)
(upholding statute making it more difficult for out-of-wedlock child born abroad to one United States
parent to claim citizenship through that parent if citizen parent was father); Miller v. Albright, 523
U.S. 420, 424 (1998) (upholding proof-of-paternity requirement imposed for citizenship by birth
whenever the citizen parent of child who is born out of wedlock and abroad ischild's father, as
opposed to the mother); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1987) (upholding preferential
treatment of children born in wedlock and their parents and children bom out of wedlock and their
mothers, as opposed to children bom out of wedlock and their fathers); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL (2019), https://fam.state.gov/fam/09FAM/09FAM020305.html
[https://perma.cc/Q3M3-GS4J] (requiring "consummation" of marriages that occur when the parties
are not in the same place for a marriage ceremony). See generally Kerry Abrams, Peaceful
Penetration:Proxy Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage, and Recognition, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 141
(2011); Jung Kim, Nguyen v. INS: The Weakening of EqualProtection in the Face ofPlenaryPower,
24 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 43 (2002); Laura Weinrib, ProtectingSex: Sexual Disincentives and SexBased Discriminationin Nguyen v. INS, 12 COLUM, J. GENDER & L. 222 (2003).
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An enduring example of the misalignment of law with contemporary
understanding is immigration law's conception of alcohol and drug
addiction as character flaws that justify exclusion and expulsion. Under
current law and practice, the use of drugs, addiction to alcohol and drugs,
and related behavior leads to thousands of noncitizens being denied U.S.
citizenship and deported from, or denied entry into, the United States
every year. 20 Although limited statistics exist regarding the number of
exclusions, deportations, and citizenship denials based on drug and
alcohol use and addiction,21 the federal government does publish statistics
relating to the drug abuser/addict ground of inadmissibility for people
seeking a visa abroad. In 2017, 1,353 people seeking lawful permanent
22
residency were denied a visa due to drug addiction.
The few attempts to mount constitutional challenges to immigration
statutes penalizing behaviors associated with addiction have failed.2 3 The
slow incorporation of prevailing scientific and social norms is not new or
limited to immigration law. As commentators have noted, the modem
understanding of addiction has only begun to influence other areas of the
law, such as our criminal justice system. 24 However, in contrast to
20. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, IMMIGRANT AND NONIMMIGRANT VISA INELIGIBILITIES tbl. xx
(2017), https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReportsFY2017AnnualReport/F

Y17AnnualReport-TableXX.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW4Z-JGWS] (citing U.S. State Department
statistics discussing the rates of inadmissibility due to drug addiction for people seeking lawful
permanent residency from a consulate abroad).
21. Statistics for lawful permanent residency applications made in the United States, as well as
deportation and denial of citizenship statistics, do not appear to be publicly available. However,
assessments of drug and alcohol use and addiction are routine in immigration adjudications and often
affect outcomes. See Mimi E. Tsankov, Tipsy: A Sobering Look At the Effects of Alcohol-Related
Incidents In Immigration Removal Proceedings, FED. L., Sept. 2012, at 22 ("Depending on the type
of relief application at issue and the nature, frequency, and recency of the alcohol-related history,
alcohol use can have a significant impact on whether or not a respondent is successful in receiving
relief."); Table 3. ICE DeportationsUnder Secure Communities by Most Serious Conviction,January
2012
October
2017,
TRAC
IMMIGR.
(Apr.
25,
2018),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/509/include/table3.html
[https://perma.cc/6PFB-8UQY]
(displaying a table showing that 20% of immigrants deported between January 2012 and October
2017 under the Secure Communities program had a drug offense as their most serious conviction).
22. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 20.
23. See, e.g., Tomaszczuk v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 159, 165-68 (6th Cir. 2018) (rejecting equal
protection challenge to "habitual drunkard" bar to showing good moral character needed for
cancellation of removal); Ledezrna-Cosina v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2017)
(rejecting equal protection challenge to the "habitual drunkard" bar to showing the good moral
character needed for naturalization); McJunkin v. INS, 579 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting
Eighth Amendment challenge to statute authorizing the deportation of any noncitizen who is, or who
has ever been, addicted to drugs); see also infra section ILI.A.
24. See generally JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT

MovEMENT (2001) (discussing the history of drug courts since their emergence in the 1990s); Susan
Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogueon Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 507
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immigration law, criminal law has made at least some advances in the last
five decades toward incorporating current thinking about substance use
disorder. Since 1962, criminal law has recognized that the status of having
an addiction cannot be a crime, and addiction can serve as a mitigating
factor in sentencing." In addition, the criminal justice system has
developed specialty drug and mental health courts to focus on
rehabilitation and treatment, diverted some defendants to rehabilitative
programs in lieu of punishment, reduced sentences for certain drug
offenses, and decriminalized marijuana possession.2 6
The time has come for immigration law to catch up to contemporary
understanding. The status of being an addict should carry no immigration
consequences, as this reflects a misplaced moral judgment. While
immigration law may legitimately reflect concerns about public safety,
behavioral triggers for deportation ought to reflect the diminished
culpability attendant to disease-influenced behavior and be proportional
to deportation, which "may result ... in loss of both property and life; or
of all that makes life worth living. ' '27 Rules for entry should similarly

(2005) (discussing the pros and cons of mental health courts).
25. See infra section III.B.
26. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, AMERICA'S PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: THE
CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND
THE CASE
FOR REFORM
16-18 (2009),

https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/d1525 If8-6dfe-4ddl -9f36-065e3224be4f/americas-problemsolving-courts-the-criminal-costs-of-treatment-and-the-case-for-reform.pdf [https://perma.cciB6TN52JL] (noting that there are over 2,000 drug courts in existence); Peggy F. Horn & Theodore Stalcup,
Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in ProblemSolving Courts, 42 GA. L. REv. 717, 719 (2008) (contrasting today's drug courts with the "traditional
criminal justice system," which "consumes vast economic and human resources in the processing of
drug abusers" and does so "without regard to the incredibly high rates of recidivism"); Jessica K.
Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1579, 1587, 1591 (2018)
(noting that "pioneering" drug courts started in the 1990s were a response to substance abuse and
other "complex social issues"). Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have legalized
marijuana, including eleven that have adopted broad laws legalizing the drug for recreational use. See
State Marijuana Law in 2019 Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/statemarijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html
[https://perma.cc/G337-SFXD]; see also BRIAN
ELDERBROOM & JULIA DURNAN, URBAN INST., RECLASSIFIED: STATE DRUG LAW REFORMS TO
REDUCE
FELONY
CONVICTIONS
AND
INCREASE
SECOND
CHANCES
3-6
(2018),

https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99077/reclassified-state..drug-law-reformsto
_reduce_felonyconvictions~andincreasesecondchances.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JL72 -DXW9]
(summarizing reclassification of drug possession offenses in states). The criminal justice systems of
the federal government and most states have diversion programs that permit certain drug offenders to
receive treatment in lieu of a conviction. See 42 U.S.C. § 3401 (2012); NAT. ASSOC. OF PRETRIAL
SERVS. AGENCIES, PROMISING PRACTICES IN PRETRIAL DIVISION 9 (2006) ("Today, NAPSA

recognizes 298 pretrial diversion programs in 45 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin
Island.").
27. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportationis Different,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1302-07 (2011); see also Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the
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reflect our society's core values, understandings, and expectations. 28 The
severity of the consequences for addiction-related behavior imposed by
immigration statutes suggests that immigration laws directed at people
suffering from addiction are animated, at least in part, by concerns about
the desirability of the noncitizens in question. 9 Only one of the statutes
imposing immigration consequences on addiction requires a showing of
harm to others.3 °
The failure to re-align our immigration policy on deportation and
exclusion with current thinking about addiction inflicts damage beyond
the harms of unwarranted family separation and the loss of talent. It
threatens our civic and political identity as a diverse and democratic
country. The bigger the gap between contemporary mores and
immigration policy and practice, the harder it is for U.S. citizens to
develop a civic and political identity that is free of ethnic and racial
animus. The cognitive dissonance created by having double standards for
citizens and noncitizens leaves society vulnerable to adopting
discriminatory or stereotypical views to justify the differential treatment.3"
This phenomenon not only harms noncitizens but thwarts the formation
of a national civic and political identity free of ethnic and racial bias.32
While all U.S. citizens suffer from the stifling of an egalitarian national
identity, the groups most affected by the double standard are non-White
citizens, including those who share a common heritage with the
noncitizens deemed undesirable.3 3
While President Trump's anti-immigrant politics and policies make
addiction-informed amendments to immigration law unlikely at the
moment, this Article provides a guide for future reform. As discussed
below, society's reaction to the current opioid epidemic may provide a
window of opportunity to improve the law, including in the area of
immigration.34 To make the case for contemporizing immigration law's
ProportionalityRequirement, 2 U.C. IRV.L. REv. 415,416-44 (2012).
28. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7
CONST. COMMENT. 9 (1990) (noting how immigration laws reflect the values undergirding
community membership).
29. See infra Part I.
30. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
31. See infra section N.A.
32. See infra section IV.A.
33. See infra section W.A.
34. See infra notes 166-174, 182 and accompanying text. Derrick Bell has described how evolution
of social and legal norms depends on interest convergence between dominant and subjugated groups.
See Derrick Bell, Diversity'sDistractions,103 COLUM. L. REv. 1622, 1624 (2003) ("[N]o matter how
much harm blacks were suffering because of racial hostility and discrimination, we could not obtain
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view of substance use and abuse and related behavior, Part I of this Article
describes the view of alcohol and drugs enshrined in immigration law.
Part II recounts a brief history of substance use and addiction, and Part III
analyzes the primary ways in which immigration and criminal courts have
analyzed the relationship between addiction, morality, and culpability. In
Part IV, this Article details the harms of the outdated views in immigration
law, which affect citizens and noncitizens alike. In closing, the Article
proposes and explains the types of legislative reforms necessary to remedy
the current state of immigration law's handling of substance use disorder.
The reforms suggested below reflect the twin principles that immigration
law should not impose consequences on the status of being an addict and
that the immigration consequences for addiction-related behavior should
not be disproportionate to the physical harm caused to others.
I.

IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF ALCOHOL AND
DRUG ADDICTION

Immigration law imposes severe consequences for drug and alcohol
addiction and related behavior, reflecting the view that people suffering
from substance use disorder are undesirable and should be denied entry into,
and deported from, the United States. Deportation or exclusion from the
United States based on addiction does not require a criminal conviction."
Throughout human history, exclusion and expulsion have existed as
tools of social control.36 For example, early humans were tribal and
depended on clear notions of membership to distinguish friends from
38
foes.37 The Latin word for "stranger," hostis, also means "enemy.Evidence of banishment as a form of punishment or community control
appears as early as the fifth century B.C.39 Before the United States was
even a nation, towns and cities enforced their borders, banishing people
deemed unworthy or a burden.4" This local border policing often reflected
meaningful relief until policymakers perceived that the relief blacks sought furthered interests or
resolved issues of more primary concern.").
35. See infra notes 49-68 and accompanying text.
36. See GEOFFREY ABBOTT, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, ExILE AND BANISHMENT (LAW),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/exile-law [https://perma.cc/Z4DU-HM56]; Melissa M. McDonald
et al., Evolution and the Psychology of Intergroup Conflict: The Male WarriorHypothesis, 367 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y BIOLOGICAL SCt. 670, 670-71 (2012).
37. McDonald et al., supra note 36, at 670-71.
38. Hostis, OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY (1968).
39. See Ostracism, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANCIENT GREECE (Nigel G. Wilson ed., 2006).
40. KUNAL M. PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAW INAMERICA,
1600-2000, at 22-25 (2015).
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racial or ethnic animus directed at certain groups.41 A century later, the
U.S. government's first immigration laws policed the national border
along similar lines. These laws prohibited the entry of women, primarily
Chinese women, considered "prostitutes" and people convicted of certain
crimes. 42 Thus, from the earliest of times in colonial America, exclusion
and expulsion practices were tied to perceived moral fitness and reflected
racial discrimination.
Alcohol use and addiction have figured into immigration law for over
a century, while immigration law has penalized drug use and addiction for
over six decades. Current immigration law imposes consequences on
substance use and abuse in four ways, which are discussed in detail below.
First, addiction to controlled substances and alcohol is a ground for
denying admission or lawful status to noncitizens seeking to enter the
United States.43 Being a drug abuser or addict also triggers deportation of
people already in the country, including those who are lawful permanent
residents." Second, addiction can bar a showing of "good moral
character," which is a statutory requirement for becoming a U.S. citizen
45
through naturalization and for some forms of relief from deportation.
Third, addiction may lead to a criminal record, which might cause the
denial of entry or initiation of removal proceedings of a person already
here.4 6 Even if applicants for immigration status have no criminal record,
their admission to the essential elements of a drug offense bars entry and
lawful status. 47 Lastly, being addicted to alcohol or drugs often counts as
a negative factor in the calculus of immigration judges and other
adjudicators when adjudicating discretionary immigration applications.4 8
A.

Addiction as a Ground of Exclusion and Deportation

Noncitizens face the denial of entry into the United States for alcohol
addiction, and both exclusion and deportation for being addicted to

41. Id. at 5-8.
42. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. 477, 477-78 (repealed 1974). For a discussion of
how the first exclusion bars were directed at Chinese women, see Kerry Abrams, Polygamy,
Prostitutionand the Federalizationof ImmigrationLaw, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 648-64 (2005).
43. See infra section I.A.

44. See infra section I.A.
45. See infra section I.B.

46. See infra section I.C.
47. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
48. Tsankov, supra note 21, at 22, 55-56 (discussing how alcohol use can negatively affect an
immigration application).
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drugs.4 9 Federal immigration law first incorporated alcohol addiction as
an express ground of exclusion in 1917 during the temperance movement,
barring the immigration of "persons with chronic alcoholism. ' 50 Others
deemed excludable at that time included "idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded
persons, epileptics, insane persons," among others. 1 In 1990, Congress
removed the express provision barring alcoholics but retained a more
general ground of exclusion that barred people with a "mental defect,"
renaming it "mental disorder," which remains in force today, 2 Under the
current "mental disorder" provision, noncitizens are rendered
inadmissible if they suffer from alcohol addiction and exhibit "behavior
associated with that disorder that may pose, or has posed, a threat to the
property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others." 53 To be excluded on
this ground, a physician designated by the government must certify that
the person has a mental disorder and associated harmful behavior. 4 As of
2010, these physicians must follow the criteria for "substance use
disorders" in the latest Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental

49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I-I) (2012) (barring admission of people who have a mental
disorder and behavior associated with the disorder may, or has, posed threat of harm); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1l82(a)(1)(A)(iv) (barring admission of people who are drug abusers or addicts); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (providing deportation ground for people addicted to drugs).
50. See Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (repealed 1952).
51. Id.
52. Compare Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(1-7), 66 Stat. 163,
182 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4-5) (excluding "chronic alcoholics" and people with a
"mental defect"), with Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5067
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(ii)(I-f1) (barring admission of people who have a "mental
disorder" and behavior associated with the disorder may, or has, posed threat of harm).
53. 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I-II); 9 FAM 302.2-7(B)(3)(U) (2019) ("Although, INA
212(a)(1)(A)(iii) does not refer explicitly to alcoholics or alcoholism, substance-related disorders
including alcohol use disorder constitutes a medical condition."); U.S. CITIZENSHIP IMMIGR. SERVS.,
POLICY MANUAL (2019), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/export [https://perma.cc/ZVK4FL9B] ("[Ajlcohol use disorders are treated as a physical or mental disorder for purposes of
determining inadmissibility."); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 34.1-4 (2019) (describing responsibilities of
medical examiners).
54. See WILLIAM R. YATES, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., REQUESTING MEDICAL
RE-EXAMINATION: ALIENS INVOLVED IN SIGNIFICANT ALCOHOL-RELATED DRIVING INCIDENTS AND

SIMILAR SCENARIOS (2004), https://www.aila.org/infonet/uscis-duis-health-related-inadmissibilitygrounds [https://perma.cc/PZ52-Q3TY] [hereinafter YATES MEMO]. Under regulations of the U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services, medical examiners screen visa applicants for alcohol and
drug use. 42 C.F.R. § 34.1-4 (2019). The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has technical instructions
to guide these physicians. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR
PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DISORDERS WITH ASSOCIATED HARMFUL BEHAVIORS AND SUBSTANCERELATED DISORDERS FOR CIVIL SURGEONS (Aug. 25, 2017), [hereinafter CDC, TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTIONS] https://www.cdc.gov/immigrantrefugeehealth/exams/ti/civit/mental-civil-technical-

instructions.html [https://perma.cc/3BZL-5L9Z].
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Disorders (DSM-V) when screening for alcohol abuse and dependence.55
Then, the civil surgeons must separately assess whether associated
harmful behavior is present.56 In practice, people seeking lawful permanent
residency or admission into the United States are often excluded if they meet
the DSM-V criteria for an alcohol-related substance use disorder and have a
57
related arrest, such as driving while under the influence.
Unlike alcohol addiction, which is only a ground for denying admission
into the United States, drug addiction has been both a ground of
inadmissibility and a ground of deportation since 1952.58 People seeking
to enter or immigrate to the United States can be denied admission and
lawful status if an examining physician finds them to be a "drug abuser or
addict" under regulations established by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services. 59 Like the technical instructions for determining whether
an alcohol-related mental defect exists, these regulations also incorporate
the DSM-V's section on substance-related disorders. A person is
considered a drug "abuse[r]" if they have a "current substance use disorder
or substance-induced disorder" that is mild under the DSM-V.60 A person
is considered a drug "addict[]" if the substance use disorder is moderate
or severe.6 1 Unlike a finding of alcohol addiction, if a civil surgeon finds

55. CDC, TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 54; DSM-V, supra note 6, at 490-91. People
whose substance abuse disorder is in remission, as defined by the DSM-V, are not inadmissible under
the drug addiction ground. See CDC, TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 54; DSM-V, supra note
6, at 491 (discussing the criteria for alcohol remission). Waivers of inadmissibility for having an
alcohol-related "mental disorder" are available in limited circumstances. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
56. See CDC, TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 54.
57. See Matter of Siniauskas, 27 1. & N. Dec. 207, 208-09 (BIA 2018) (noting that in a
determination of whether a noncitizen is a danger to the community in bond proceedings, driving
under the influence is a significant adverse consideration). U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services
considers "[a] record of criminal arrests and/or convictions for alcohol-related driving incidents may
constitute evidence of a health-related inadmissibility as a physical or mental disorder with associated
harmful behavior." U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MANUAL CHAPTER 7 PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DISORDER WITH
ASSOCIATED HARMFUL
BEHAVIOR
https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTMLIPolicyManual-Volume8-PartB-Chapter7.htm

(2019),

[https://perma.cc/TJY3-UWSE].
58. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2012) (barring admission of people who are drug abusers or
addicts); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (providing deportation ground for people addicted to drugs).
Prior to 1952, addiction to drugs was not ground for deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 155(a).

59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)(A)(iv); 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(h) (2019) (drug abuse); 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(i)
(drug addiction). While there is no waiver for the drug addiction and abuse ground of inadmissibility,
drug addicts and abusers are admissible if their addiction is in remission, as defined by the DSM-V.
See CDC, TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 54.
60. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(h) (drug abuse); 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(i) (drug addiction); DSM-V, supra note 6.
61. For the diagnostic criteria of a substance use disorder, see DSM-V, supra note 6. A diagnosis
of moderate substance use or substance-induced disorder involves the presence of four to five of the
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that an individual has a moderate or severe substance use disorder that
involves a controlled substance, no additional showing of associated
62
harmful behavior is needed.
Under the ground of deportation, any noncitizen, including longtime
lawful permanent residents, can be deported if they are, or at any time
after admission have been, a drug abuser or addict .6 3 An immigrant need
64
not have engaged in related harmful behavior to trigger this statute,
which has not been substantively amended since its enactment. Even
though this provision applies to longtime permanent residents, it is harsher
than the ground of inadmissibility in several ways. Unlike inadmissibility,
deportation applies to people who were abusers or addicts in the past but
who are now in remission.6 1 Moreover, unlike inadmissibility, deportation
does not require an examination by a physician.66 As a result, adjudicators
are left to their own devices to make findings. A training guide for
immigration adjudicators contains a definition of addict that is not based
on the DSM-V and references "public morals." 67 While significant
numbers of people have been excluded under the addiction ground of
inadmissibility, only small numbers of noncitizens already in the United
States have been deported under the addiction ground of deportation.68
symptoms of a substance use disorder. A severe diagnosis involves six or more symptoms. See id.;
CDC, TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 54, at 3.

62. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(A)(1H7) (2012), with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iv).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (providing deportation ground for people addicted to drugs).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iv) (requiring determination of drug abuse or addiction
under regulations issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services), with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring no such determination).
67. The training handbook states that
[t]he term 'addict' means any person who habitually uses any habit-forming narcotic drugs so as
to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is or has been so far addicted to
the use of such habit-forming narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with
reference to his addiction.
U.S. CrTIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., BASIC: BSC_217
INADMISSIBILITY, DEPORTABILITY AND WAIVERS INSTRUCTOR GUIDE 134 AILA No. 15082634
(2015), https://www.aila.org/infonet/uscis-instructor-guide-training [https://perma.cc/86T4-UAPQ].
68. Between 2002 and 2011,

only 307 immigrants in the United States were charged as

"deportable" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) for being drug addicts or drug abusers. See Charges
Asserted in Deportation Proceedings in the Immigration Courts: FY 2002 - FY 2011,
TRACIMMIGRATION
(2011),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/260/include/detailchg.html

[https://perma.cc/CJT6-T8MJ]. Few published cases exist that involve the addiction ground of
deportation. See generally McJunkin v. INS, 579 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that proceedings

against the noncitizen under the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, including the commitment order
of the district court, were sufficient to establish that the noncitizen was a drug addict and thus
deportable); Espindola v. Barber, 152 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (denying noncitizen derivative
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However, as discussed below, people who suffer from addiction are more
likely to come to the attention of immigration enforcement officials and
face removal if they have even a minor criminal record.69
B.

The "HabitualDrunkard"Bar to Good Moral Character

At the same time that Congress added addiction-related health grounds
of exclusion and deportation in the 1952 Act, it made being a "habitual
drunkard" a bar to the showing of "good moral character," thus expressly
tying alcohol abuse to morality." The habitual drunkard bar derives from
the common-law status offense of being a "common drunkard."'" The
1952 Immigration and Nationality Act's (INA) good moral character
definition replaced a more general requirement, first adopted in 1790, that
72
required that applicants demonstrate "good character" to naturalize.
Good moral character is a requirement for certain types of applications for
lawful permanent residency and is a requirement for lawful permanent
73
residents to become U.S. citizens through the process of naturalization.
citizenship and subjecting them to deportation after being adjudicated as a narcotic drug addict). In
contrast, almost 600 people in 2017 were denied lawful permanent residency under the drug addict or
abuser ground of inadmissibility at a U.S. consulate abroad. See supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
69. See infra section I.C.
70. See immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(f), 66 Stat. 163, 172 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §1101 (f) ("No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person
of good moral character who during the period for which good moral character is required to be
established is, or was.., a habitual drunkard."). For a discussion of the origins of the phrase "habitual
drunkard," see generally Harry G. Levine, The Discovery of Addiction: Changing Conceptions of
HabitualDrunkenness in America, 39 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 143 (1978); Jayesh M. Rathod, Distilling
Americans: The Legacy ofProhibitionon US. Immigration Laws, 51 HOUSTON L. REv. 781, 793-97
(2014). For a critique of the use of good moral character as a predictor of future negative behavior,
see generally Deborah L. Rhode, Virtue and the Law: The Good Moral CharacterRequirement in
OccupationalLicensing, BarRegulation and Immigration Proceedings43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1027
(2018).
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). "Persons with chronic alcoholism" were excluded from the United States
starting in 1917. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875, repealed by
§403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 279. For a discussion of the origin of the status crime of being a "common
drunkard," see generally Erik Luna, The Story of Robinson: From Revolutionary Constitutional
Doctrine to Modest Ban on Status Crimes, in CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 47 (Donna Coker & Robert
Weisberg eds., 2013).
72. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, repealedby Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat.
414, 415 (modifying requirement to "good moral character"), Subsequent naturalization statutes also
included a general good character requirement, but the requirement was not specifically defined until
the INA was enacted in 1952. See generally Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character
Requirementfor U.S. Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J. 1571 (2012).
73. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(ll)(bb) (requiring that VAWA self-petitioners be persons of
good moral character); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B) (non-lawful permanent resident who is seeking
cancellation of removal must establish her good moral character during the ten-year period preceding
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Typically, lawful permanent residents must show five years of good moral
character to qualify to become a U.S. citizen.74
The INA defined "good moral character" for the first time by
specifying what attributes or behaviors would constitute an absolute bar
to showing good moral character-including being a "habitual
drunkard."7 5 However, scant case law interprets, or applies, the term
habitual drunkard in the good moral character definition. The only
published decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) occurred
in Matter ofH-, only three years after the INA was enacted.76 In that case,
the noncitizen's treating doctor testified that his patient was a hospitalized
chronic alcoholic who had "escaped" a few times and had begun to
"immediately. . . drink[] heavily."77 The BIA found that the noncitizen
qualified as a "habitual drunkard."7 8 The BIA equated alcoholism with
habitual drinking, making no attempt to distinguish between alcoholism
as a medical condition and habitual drinking as a symptom of a nonrecovered alcoholic.7 9 Nor did the BIA require a showing of harmful
behavior for the noncitizen to be considered lacking good moral character
as a habitual drunkard.8" Today, the ill-defined habitual drunkard bar

the date of the application); 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012) (requiring good moral character for
naturalization); Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L No. 105-100,
§ 203(f)(1)(A)(iii), 111 Stat. 2160, 2198 (1997) (requiring good moral character for relief eligibility);
8 C.F.R. § 1240.65(b)(2) (requiring good moral character for suspension of deportation). It is also a
requirement for voluntary departure. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(l), 1229c(b)(1)(B) (limiting eligibility for
cancellation of deportation or voluntary departure to non-citizens of good moral character). While not
a defense to removal, voluntary departure is a benefit in that it permits a noncitizen to avoid having
an order of removal on their record.
74. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).
75. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(f) 66 Stat. 163, 172 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §1101(f))
76. Id.; see also A. Herbert Safford, Habitual Drunkenness, 30 LAW MAG. & L. REv. Q.J.
JURISPRUDENCE 108, 108 (1871) (discussing the history of habitual drunkenness); Kevin Lapp,
Reforming the Good Moral CharacterRequirementfor U.S. Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J. 1571, 1584-93
(2012) (arguing that the "habitual drunkard" requirement, and other good moral character
requirements, are vague); L.S. Tao, CriminalDrunkenness andthe Law, 54 IOWA L. REv. 1059, 1075
(1969) (arguing that "habitual drunkenness" is not well-defined); Note, Alcohol Abuse and the Law,
94 HARv. L. REv. 1660, 1665 (1981) (discussing the ambiguity and wide scope of definitions of
"public intoxication").
77. MatterofH-, 6 1.& N. Dec. at 616.
78. Id.
79. See id. (basing the "habitual drunkard" finding on the fact that the noncitizen left a hospital and
started drinking).
80. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has interpreted the term "habitual drunkard"
to require a showing of harmful conduct. Tomaszczuk v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 159, 166 (6th Cir. 2018).
While drug addiction is not a bar to showing good moral character, noncitizens who admit to the
essential elements of a drug offense are barred from showing good moral character, even if they have
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remains in force and represents the most express link between alcohol and
morality in the INA.
C.

Crime-Related ImmigrationProvisions

Substance use and addiction also figure into our immigration
enforcement system through the criminal justice system.8 1 Studies show a
high correlation between addiction and having a criminal record.82 For
example, addiction can lead people to commit property crimes or to sell
small quantities of drugs to generate cash needed to sustain a substance

use disorder.83 Being arrested, convicted, or even admitting to a criminal
offense, can have serious immigration consequences.8 4 Drug offenses
carry some of the most severe consequences in immigration law.85 The
drug grounds of deportation and exclusion were added to the INA in 1952,
and Congress later expanded them.8 6 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
created an aggravated felony ground of deportation and defined it to
no criminal record. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (2012) (cross-referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)
(2012)); infra section I.C.
81. See generally Katherine Beckett & Heather Evans, Crimmigrationat the Local Level: Criminal
Justice Processes in the Shadow of Deportation,49 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 241 (2015) (discussing how
immigration has become intertwined with the criminal justice system).
82. See Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, A Sober Assessment of the Link Between Substance
Abuse and Crime-EliminatingDrug and Alcohol Use from the Sentencing Calculus, 56 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 243, 244-53 (2016) ("Most crimes are committed by offenders who are substance
involved, and nearly half of all crimes that are committed are done so by offenders who are intoxicated
at the time of the offense."); Redonna K. Chandler et al., Treating Drug Abuse and Addiction in the
CriminalJusticeSystem: Improving PublicHealth and Safety, 301 JAMA 183, 183-84 (2009); Rajita
Sinha & Caroline Easton, Substance Abuse and Criminality,27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 513,
514 (1999); Megan Testa, Imprisonment of the Mentally Ill: A Callfor Diversion to the Community
Mental Health System, 8 ALB. GOV'T L. REv. 405, 411-12 (2015).
83. See Benjamin R. Nordstrom & Charles A. Dackis, Drugs and Crime, 39 J. PSYCH. & L. 663,
674-83 (2011); David N. Nurco et al., Differential CriminalPatternsof Narcotic Addicts Over an
Addiction Career,26 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 418-21 (1988); Lauren Rousseau & I. Eric Nordan, Tug v.
Mingo: Let the Plaintiffs Sue-OpioidAddiction, the Wrongful Conduct Rule, and the Culpability
Exception, 34 W. MICH. U. COOLEY L. REv. 33, 33 (2017) ("The drive to obtain these drugs often
leads to criminal behavior, such as forging prescriptions, lying to obtain drugs, and unlawfully
possessing and using drugs.").
84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (criminal grounds of inadmissibility); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2012)
(criminal grounds of deportation).
85. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (controlled substance ground of inadmissibility); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B) (controlled substance ground of deportation); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),
1101(a)(43)(B) (setting forth the illicit trafficking provision of the aggravated felony ground of
deportation).
86. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)) (discussing exclusion); id. § 241(a), at 206 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)) (discussing deportation); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751, 100
Stat. 3207, 3207-47 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), 1227(a)(2)(B)).
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87
include drug trafficking, which includes sale of a small amount of drugs.
Any conviction for an offense relating to a federally controlled substance,
including misdemeanors, is a ground for denying noncitizens entry into
the United States, even if they are married to a U.S. citizen.88 In 1990,
Congress amended the law to render inadmissible any noncitizen who
admits to the essential elements of a drug offense, even if there was no
conviction.89 In a 2002 case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, for example, an applicant for lawful permanent residency
admitted to using marijuana when he was under twenty-one, and, as a
result, the U.S. government denied his residency application.9" Such
denials are common. 91 Noncitizens who admit to the essential elements of

87. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4469-70 (codified
as amended at 8U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)).
89. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)). 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(lI) makes inadmissible "any alien convicted of, or
who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements
of... a violation of (or a conspiracy to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or
a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21)."
Immigration enforcement officials regularly pursue these admissions to drug use. See, e.g., Pazcoguin
v. Radcliffe 292 F.3d 1209, 1214-18 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended on denial of reh"g and reh"g en
banc, 308 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing applicant admitted to past drug use); Romero-Fereyros
v. Attorney General, 221 F. App'x 160, 162-63 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing applicant interrogated
about past drug use); see also KErTH HUNSUCKER, FED. LAW ENF'T TRAINING CTR., CRIMINAL
WITHOUT CONVICTION-PROSECUTING THE UNCONVICTED ARRIVING CRIMINAL ALIEN UNDER
SECTION
212(A)(2)(A)
OF
THE
IMMIGRATION
AND
NATIONALITY
ACT
2,

http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-division/the-informer/research-bysubject/miscellaneous/ aliencriminalwithoutconviction.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERT4-HSN8] ("If the
alien admits to such criminal activity, the alien can then be refused admission to the United States,
even though he has not been convicted of the criminal offense.").
90. Pazcoguin, 292 F.3d at 1216-18.
91. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Sessions, 741 F. App'x 381, 384-85 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing
admission by noncitizen he possessed and smoked marijuana constituted an admission that he
committed acts which constituted the essential elements of violations of a law relating to a controlled
substance); Martinez v. Att'y Gen., 577 F. App'x 969, 971-72 (1 lth Cir. 2014) (relying correctly
upon a pretrial intervention document stating that the noncitizen had admitted to possessing cocaine
as evidence of admission to a drug offense); Romero-Fereyros,221 F. App'x at 162-65 (discussing
an applicant who was denied a visa in 2005 after admitting to cocaine use); Talioaga v. Gonzales, 212
F. App'x 612, 614 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding finding of admission to essential elements of a drug
offense based on admission to doctors during physical and psychiatric examinations required for an
immigrant visa); Galvez v. Ashcroft, 98 F. App'x 666, 667-68 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing admission
to drug use rendered noncitizen inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)). The only waiver
of inadmissibility for having been convicted or having admitted the essential elements of a controlled
substance offense is available for a single simple possession of under 30 grams of marijuana. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(h). This limited waiver was added to the INA in 1981. See Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 8, 95 Stat. 1611, 1616. It is only available to individuals
who can show that a close family member who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident would
suffer extreme hardship if the individual was denied admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

1908

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1891

a drug offense are also barred from showing good moral character on
applications for naturalization, even if they have no criminal record.9 2
All drug offenses, except a single conviction of "30 grams or less" of
marijuana possession for one's own use, are grounds for deportation of
people already inside the United States, including lawful permanent
residents.9 3 No exceptions exist for people convicted while they were
under eighteen, and no statute of limitations limits the use of old
convictions as the basis for immigration consequences.94 Convictions
involving a federally controlled substance and an element of sale or
commercial dealing are considered "aggravated felonies" and trigger an
additional ground of deportation.95 The immigration statute makes no
distinction between drug distributions related to sustaining a drug
addiction and other types of sales. The aggravated felony designation is
the most serious under immigration law. Virtually no discretion exists for
immigration judges or other adjudicators to halt the deportation of
someone with an aggravated felony conviction, regardless of the length of
time they have been a lawful permanent resident, their rehabilitation, and
96
hardship to family caused by deportation.
Prior to sweeping amendments to immigration law in 1996, the law
permitted immigration judges and other adjudicators to consider a variety
of factors to determine whether a waiver of deportation was warranted, as
long as the noncitizen had permanent resident status and had not served
five years of a prison sentence for an aggravated felony. 97 These waivers

92. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I1). This ground is incorporated into the good moral character
definition by reference. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(3) (cross-referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)).
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (setting forth the ground of deportation for controlled substance
conviction).
94. Id. For a critique of the harshness of immigration law's treatment of controlled substance
convictions even prior to major amendments in 1996, see Steven Legomsky, Reforming the Criteria
for the Exclusion and the DeportationofAlien CriminalOffenders, 12 IN DEF. OF THE ALIEN 64, 6566 (1990). Amendments in 1996 increased the consequences for criminal convictions, including those
relating to controlled substances. See generally Daniel C. Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the
Doughnut: DiscretionandDeference in US. Immigration Law, 71 TuL. L REV. 703 (1997).
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (defining "aggravated felony"); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
("aggravated felony" is a ground for deportation); see Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53-54 (2006)
(stating that "ordinarily 'trafficking' means some sort of commercial dealing"); Matter of Davis, 20
I. & N. Dec. 536, 541 (BIA 1992) (stating that a "business or merchant nature, the trading or dealing
of goods," is essential for trafficking). As a result, single conviction for possession of a small amount
of marijuana with intent to sell qualifies as an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
(aggravated felony ground of deportation); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) ("trafficking" provision of
aggravated felony definition).
96. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (barring lawful permanent resident cancellation of removal for any
applicant convicted of an aggravated felony).
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c); see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
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allowed adjudicators to consider all relevant factors, including whether
the applicant suffered from a substance use disorder and whether the
underlying criminal act was related to the disorder.9 8 With the elimination
of the waiver in 1996, 99 judges retain only narrow discretion in a limited
number of cases. 100 Today, the primary discretionary remedy for lawful
permanent residents is not available to people who have an aggravated
felony conviction, including a small drug sale conviction related to
addiction.0 Individuals who have not had their lawful permanent
residency for at least five years are also not eligible."12
Alcohol-related offenses may also trigger crime-based exclusion or
deportation, although not as often as drug crimes. Some driving under the
influence (DUI) statutes have been held to constitute crimes that fall
within the removal grounds referencing a "crime involving moral
turpitude," while others have not. 103 Similarly, some aggravated DUI
convictions have been considered aggravated felonies. 1" In October

No. 104-132, § 440,110 Stat. 1214, 1277; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-597, amended by Act of October 11,
1996, Pub. L. No. 104, § 302, 110 Stat. 3656.
98. See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584-85 (BIA 1978).
99. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 304(b); see also INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 (2001) (summarizing history of the discretionary waiver under former 8
U.S.C. § 1182(c) and its repeal in 1996).
100. The waiver under former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) was replaced by cancellation of removal, a much
more limited form of relief See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
§ 304(a) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012)) (setting forth the cancellation of removal for lawful
permanent residents).
101. Id
102. Id. In addition, applicants for cancellation of removal must have been admitted to the United
States in any status at least seven years before having committed the removable offense and before
being placed into removal proceedings. Id. Applicants stop accruing time towards eligibility for
cancellation of removal once served with a charging document putting them in removal proceedings
or once they commit a crime making them removable. Id. § 1229b(d)(1).
103. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Compare Matter of Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 78 (BIA 2001)
(holding that Arizona conviction for aggravated DUI due to prior DUI convictions was not crime
involving moral turpitude), with Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1194-96 (BIA 1999)
(holding that Arizona conviction for aggravated DUI that included a scienter element of knowledge
was a crime involving moral turpitude); and Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 912-17
(9th Cir. 2009) (upholding BIA's determination that noncitizen's conviction for DUI with a suspended
license was a crime involving moral turpitude). Even if the noncitizen is already deportable because
of prior criminal history or immigration violations, the specifics of the additional conviction can affect
eligibility for discretionary relief. See, e.g., Navarette v. Holder, No. CV-F-09-1255, 2010 WL
1611141, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2010) (analyzing a DUI conviction vis-Ai-vis discretionary good
moral character).
104. United States v. McGill, 450 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that Alabama's DUI
statute is a crime of violence). But see Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (holding that Florida
aggravated DUI conviction was not a crime of violence aggravated felony because the statute was a
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2019, the U.S. Attorney General ruled that noncitizens with two or more
non-aggravated DUIs are presumptively barred from showing good moral
character and that evidence of rehabilitation is irrelevant.1 05
D.

DiscretionaryDeterminations

Although the 1996 amendments to immigration law dramatically
scaled back discretionary waivers of deportation for people facing
removal on account of a criminal record, judges still adjudicate the few
waivers that were in the pipeline before the changes, as well as a handful
of other types of applications for discretionary relief.10 6 Standard practice
is for the judge to assess the seriousness of the underlying circumstances
of the activity that led to a criminal record and to consider evidence of
rehabilitation and hardship to family members in the event of
deportation.'0 7 If the applicant suffers from substance use disorder, this
diagnosis would be relevant to the inquiry into hardship and rehabilitation.
Facts relating to drug and alcohol use routinely emerge in testimony
and other evidence before the immigration judge. 0 8 Neither the BIA nor
federal circuit courts have provided guidance on how addiction figures
into the discretionary calculus, including whether substance use disorder
constitutes a positive or negative factor."° A survey of administrative
appellate decisions reveals that abuse or addiction to drugs or alcohol is

strict liability offense). The U.S. Supreme Court has struck down part of the crime of violence
aggravated felony ground as void for vagueness. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ 138 S. Ct.
1204, 1223 (2018).
105. Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 1. & N. Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019). Studies of people in treatment
programs after a DUI conviction show that nearly all repeat DIJ offenders suffer from substance use
disorder. Howard J. Shaffer et al., The Epidemiology of PsychiatricDisordersAmong Repeat DUI
Offenders Accepting a Treatment-SentencingOption, 75 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 795,
802 (2007); see also Sandra C. Lapham et al., PsychiatricDisordersin a Sample ofRepeat ImpairedDriving Offenders, 67 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL & DRUGS 707, 710-11 (2006). The DSM-V diagnostic
standards include repeated conduct like driving after drinking as a symptom of substance use disorder.
See DSM-V, supra note 6, at 483-84,491, 541.
106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (setting forth refugee waiver); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (setting forth
cancellation of removal for lawful permanent residents); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (stating that discretionary
criminal waiver is not available for drug offenses with the exception of a single conviction of simple
possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana).
107. See Matter of Marin, 16 1. & N. Dec. 581, 584-85 (BIA 1978) (describing the factors involved
in the discretionary analysis); Matter of C-V-T-, 22 1.& N. Dec. 7, 10-12 (BIA 1998) (applying the
Marin factors to cancellation for removal cases).
108. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., A GUIDE FOR IMMIGRATION ADVOCATES 12-16-12-23

(18th ed. 2012) (discussing rehabilitation in cancellation cases and case examples involving drug
addiction).
109. Tsankov, supra note 21, at 22, 55 (noting the lack of guidance to immigration adjudicators).

2019]

ADDICTION-INFORMED REFORM

1911

typically considered a negative factor in discretionary determinations. 10
In the absence of appellate guidance, immigration judges are left to rely
on their own views about addiction. A judge who understands addiction
as a medical condition might be more willing to grant discretionary relief
to someone if there was a connection between their criminal record and
their substance use disorder. In contrast, a judge who views addiction as
a choice or a moral failing might take the opposite approach. The absence
of a clear understanding of the nature of addiction, and its relevance to
discretionary determinations, leaves adjudicators to their own devices
when exercising discretion for, or against, noncitizens suffering from
substance use disorder. Trainings for immigration judges are rare, and at
least one recent annual training was cancelled. 11 Materials distributed at
the 2018 Legal Training Program for Immigration Judges did not address
the relevance of addiction to adjudications.112
II.

UNDERSTANDING SUBSTANCE USE AND ADDICTION

As the previous Part describes, addiction and related behavior trigger
severe immigration consequences, reflecting the outdated view that our
legal system should castigate those who suffer from substance use
disorder. This Part traces the history of societal thinking about drug and
alcohol use and addiction, demonstrating how views have shifted over
time, influenced by science, cultural norms, as well as racial and ethnic
110. There are no published decisions of the BIA expressly addressing whether addiction to drugs
or alcohol is a positive or negative factor in the exercise of discretion. Unpublished decisions of the
BIA illustrate that drug and alcohol addiction is considered a negative factor. See, e.g., In Re: Juan
Angel Martinez-Gonzalez A.K.A. Juan Angel Gonzalez-Martinez, A074 669 817 LOS, 2018 WL
3045825, at *2 (BIA Apr. 27, 2018) (declining to count the fact that criminal history "stemm[ed]
from ...abuse of alcohol" as mitigating factor); In Re: Emmanuel Babajide Adegbite, A086 976 697
ATL, 2017 WL 1330141, at *1 (11A Mar. 3, 2017) (including "negative factors" within "history of
alcohol abuse"); In Re: Herick Juvenal Guevara Argueta, A096 242 065 ARL, 2015 WL 5180597, at
*3 (BIA Aug. 5, 2015) (noting that the noncitizen "has a serious alcohol problem and, although an
admitted alcoholic, has continued to drink"); In Re: Evvers Rafael Guevara-Moreno, A36 064 070
ELOY, 2008 WL 2401103, at *3 (BIA May 1, 2008) (listing "drug abuse history" as a negative
factor); In Re: Miguel Angel Pasillas Pinedo A.K.A. Miguel Angel Pasillas, A90 057 238 ELOY,
2007 WL 3318653, at *1 (BIA Sept. 14, 2007) (including "negative equities" within "abuse of
controlled substances").
111. See Paul Smidt & Jeffrey Chase, HON. JEFFREY CHASE: Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B- &
The Unresolved Tension In Asylum Adjudication!- Plus My Added Commentary On EOIR Training!,
IMMIGR. COURTSIDE BLOG (Feb. 05, 2018), https://immigrationcourtside.com/2018/02/05/honjefrey-chase-matter-of-w-y-c-h-o-b-the-unresolved-tension-in-asylum-adjudication-plus-my-addedcommentary-on-eoir-training/ [https://perma.cc/H5SS-8NV3].
112. See EOIR Releases Materialsfrom the 2018 Legal TrainingProgramfor ImmigrationJudges,
AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS'N (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/eoir-2018-training-programjudges [https://perma.cc/38Y4-9H6Z].
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animus. Drug and alcohol use and addiction are complex phenomena with
biological, psychosocial, and cultural-historical dimensions. 1 '
A.

A BriefHistory

Alcohol and other mind-altering substances play an important role in
society. 14 Over the course of human history, they have been tied to
religious, ceremonial, and medical practices. 115 Substance use is found in
almost all cultures throughout human existence, suggesting it is rooted in
fundamental human traits linked to adaptation and survival.116 For
example, the first evidence of alcohol use was in Egyptian and
17
Mesopotamian civilizations more than 6,000 years ago.1
The first use of opium also dates to more than 6,000 years ago in
Sumeria, current-day Iraq.I 8 In the sixth or seventh century A.D., opium
reached China and East Asia through traders to the west, leading to its
widespread use in mainly communal settings in Asia." 9 In the latter half
of the 1800s, Europeans became keenly interested in opium, including for
medicinal purposes. Used in a manner similar to aspirin, it served as a
20
painkiller and sedative and for dysentery, diarrhea, and coughs.'
113. See generally Russil DURRANT & Jo THAKKER, SUBSTANCE USE AND ABUSE: CULTURAL
AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (2003); Robert West, Editorial, Theories of Addiction, 96
ADDICTION 2001, at 3; see also Sana Loue, The Criminalizationofthe Addictions: Toward a Unified
Approach, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 281, 292-93 (2003) (discussing how medical and societal views of
alcohol have changed over time); NORMAN ZINBERG, DRUG, SET, AND SETTING (1984) (discussing
cultural and social influences on drug use).
114. For historical accounts of American societal views on alcohol and other mind-altering
substances, see generally Genevieve M. Ames, American Beliefs About Alcoholism: Historical
Perspectives on the Medical-Moral Controversy, in THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH ALCOHOL:

CONTRASTING CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 23, 29-31 (Linda A. Bennett & Genevieve M. Ames eds.,
1985); CHRISTOPHER M. FNAN, DRUNKS: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2017); MARK E. LENDER &
JAMES K. MARTIN, DRINKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 129, 131 (1982); WILLIAM L WHITE,
SLAYING THE DRAGON: THE HISTORY OF ADDICTION TREATMENT AND RECOVERY IN AMERICA

(2014); Harry G. Levine, The Discovery of Addiction: Changing Conceptions of Habitual
Drunkenness in America, in 39 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 143, 143-44 (1978).
115. See DURRANT & THAKKER, supra note 113, at 64, 90.
116. Id. at 35.
117. Id.at 64.
118. See THOMAS M. SANTELLA & D. J. TRIGGLE, OPIUM 8-9 (2007); Michael J. Brownstein, A
Brief History of Opiates, OpioidPeptides, and Opioid Receptors, 90 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sc. USA
5391, 5391-93 (1993), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC46725/pdf/pnas014690022.pdf. Neolithic sites in Switzerland suggest the cultivation of opium poppies. See DURRANT &
THAKKER, supra note 113, at 65. Evidence dating from 315-92 A.D. suggests that women used
cannabis to ease the process of giving birth. Id, at 62.
119. See ZHENG YANGWEN, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF OPIUM IN CHINA 5 (2005) (citing MARTIN
BOOTH, OPIUM: A HISTORY (1997)).

120. See DURRANT & THAKKER, supra note 113, at 75. Sigmund Freud recommended cocaine to

2019]

ADDICTION-INFORMED REFORM

1913

Similarly, in nineteenth century America, cocaine was used to treat a wide
range of illnesses, including morphine and alcohol addiction.1 21 During
the Civil War, numerous soldiers became addicted to the morphine used
to treat their wounds. 12 2 The dominant use of mind-altering drugs in the
United States turned recreational in the late nineteenth century. 23
The scientific and popular understanding of substance addiction has
also changed with time. While the addictive nature of certain substances
was known to doctors in ancient Greece and Rome,124 the roots of the
modem notion of addiction as a disease with symptoms requiring
treatment lie in writings from the late eighteenth century. 125 In the United
States, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the first
institutionalized response to alcoholism as a disease needing treatment
with the founding of homes and asylums for people struggling with
alcohol.12 6 However, these institutions eventually gave way to an
understanding of addiction as either a mental infirmity needing
psychiatric intervention, or willful misconduct best dealt with by the
criminal justice system. 127 Likewise, in 1910, President Taft declared a

treat such wide-ranging ailments as syphilis, asthma, and digestive disorders. WHITE, supra note 114,
at 147.
121. See WHITE, supra note 114, at 146.
122. Sana Loue, The Criminalizationof the Addictions Toward A Unified Approach, 24 J. LEG.
MED. 281, 310 (2003).
123. SARAH W. TRACY & CAROLINE J. ACKER, INTRODUCTION TO ALTERING AMERICAN
CONSCIOUSNESS: THE HISTORY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1800-2000, at

14-15 (2004) ("In the nineteenth century, Romantics associated opium and hashish use with
exoticism, Orientalism, and stimulation of the imagination. Fitzhugh Ludlow's The Hashish
Eater exemplified the literature that explored psychoactive drug effects with interest. On a more
mundane level, an emerging American middle class sought to relieve the pressures of work and social
life in an increasingly complex urban industrial economy through drugs, particularly opiates and
cocaine.").
124. See DUPRRANT & THAKKER, supra note 113, at 65; ELVIN M. JELLINEK, THE DISEASE
CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM 150-51 (1960); WHITE, supra note 114, at 31. In ancient Egypt, people
were described as "mad from wine or beer." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. The writings of Benjamin Rush and Thomas Trotter were highly influential. See generally
BENJAMIN RUSH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF ARDENT SPIRrTS 5, 22 (1784) (discussing
diseases stemming from "habitual use" of alcohol, and characterizing them as of a "mortal" or "fatal"
nature); THOMAS TROTTER, AN ESSAY: MEDICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL AND CHEMICAL, ON
DRUNKENNESS AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE HUMAN BODY (1804).

126. See WHITE, supra note 114, at 31-62. White describes these institutions as "mark[ing] the
first broadscale professional movement to medicalize excessive drinking and drug use in America."
Id. at 43.
127. See WHITE, supra note 114, at 44; see also Leavitt v. City of Morris, 117 N.W. 393, 395
(Minn. 1908) (noting that legislators were increasingly treating alcohol addiction "as a disease of
mind and body, analogous to insanity .... ").

1914

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1891

cocaine epidemic.128 Four years later, Congress made the use of cocaine
and opiates illegal, converting patients into criminals and thwarting the
development of the disease understanding of drug addiction.' 29 The
Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution criminalized the
possession and use of alcohol from 1920 until the Twenty-first
Amendment restored the legality of alcohol in 1933.3'
In 1935, during the Great Depression, Alcoholics Anonymous launched
3
the modem mutual-aid movement for intervention into alcohol addiction.' '
Like earlier nineteenth century groups, Alcoholics Anonymous called for
the intervention into and treatment of alcoholism. 32 Between the 1930s and
the 1950s, the group spearheaded a movement that began to "transform[]
the alcoholic from a morally deformed perpetrator of harm to a sick person
1 33
worthy of sympathy and support.'
In 1960, Elvin Jellinek's canonical book, The Medical Concept of
Alcoholism, heavily influenced the public's perception of alcoholism.' 3 4
This disease model popularized a comparison of alcohol addiction to
diabetes, analogizing the alcoholic and drug addict as needing substances
in the same way that a diabetic needs insulin. 3 5 In 1965 and 1967, two
crime commissions under the Johnson Administration concluded that
alcoholics should be treated, not incarcerated, and that the criminal justice

128. See David F. Musto, America's First Cocaine Epidemic, 13-3 WILSON QUARTERLY 59, 64
(1989). President Taft's views on opium originated with his Opium Commissioner, Hamilton Wright.
See INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL OPIUM COMMISSION (1909).
129. Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970, and replaced with the Controlled
Substances Act); see also Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1919) (stating that a
physician's provision of morphine to an addict could be illegal under some circumstances); U.S. v.
Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 402 (1916) (stating that possession by addict of illegal drugs was a
violation of the Harrison Act).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933); National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41
Stat. 305 (1919) (also known as the "Volstead Act").
131. See generally ERNEST KURTZ, NOT GOD: A HISTORY OF ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS (1991).

132. Id. One of the first groups of recovered alcoholics was from the 1840s, called the
Washingtonians. Thomas J.Reed, The Futile Fifth Step: Compulsory Disclosure of Confidential
CommunicationsAmong Alcoholics Anonymous Members, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 693 (1996).
133. See WHITE, supra note 114, at 233.
134. See generally ELVIN JELLINEK, THE MEDICAL CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM (1960); see also
Joseph W. Schneider, Deviant Drinking as Disease: Alcoholism as a Social Accomplishment, in
DRUGS, ALCOHOL, AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 26 (James D. Orcutt & David R. Rudy eds., 2003)

(discussing Jellinek's landmark work with Alcoholics Anonymous and published studies).
135. See MICHELLE L. MCCLELLAN, LADY LUSHES: GENDER, ALCOHOLISM, AND MEDICINE IN

MODERN AMERICA 105 (2017), https://books.google.com/books?id=DG8kDwAAQBAJ&pg-PA10
5&dq=alcoholism+diabetes+metaphor&hl=en&sa=X&ved=OahUKEwipr6Ls5cfcAhUFmkKHQNj
C3EQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=diabetes&f-false [https://perma.cc/DC94-EE6W].
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system should deal "flexibl[y]" with drug offenders.136 Betty Ford's highprofile struggle with alcohol and drug addiction generated sympathy and
understanding within mainstream America.' 3 7 Sustained campaigns
started in the 1990s to educate the public about addiction, particularly
alcoholism. 38 Popular television shows and magazines disseminated destigmatizing messages that portrayed addiction as a chronic disease. 139
While the condemnation of people addicted to alcohol began to cool,
the criminalization of narcotics use and DUIs heated up. 4 ° In 1951, the
Boggs Act upped sentences for drug offenses and established mandatory
minimum sentences. 141 President Eisenhower declared a "new war on
narcotic addiction" in 1954.142 The Narcotic Control Act of 1956 further
43
raised criminal penalties to include life imprisonment and even death.1
The criminalization of drug possession and sale was followed by the
steady increase in drug offense penalties through the 1990s.'" Reflecting
the general push for heavy penalties for criminal behavior, states and
localities began more aggressive enforcement of laws against DIJs and
lengthened DUI sentences. 145 During this same period of time, Congress
amended immigration law to expand the grounds for removing

136. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENF'T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN

A FREE SOCIETY 223-24, 236 (1967). In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse
and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act, establishing the National Institute on
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA). Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-616, § 101(a), 84 Stat. 1848, 1848.
In 1971, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created a model legal
code that called for the decriminalization of public intoxication called the Uniform Alcoholism and
Intoxication Act. See WHITE, supra note 114, at 453.
137. See WHITE, supra note 114, at 395.
138. See Patricia M. Loewit-Phillips & Abbie Goldbas, Mothers Against DrunkDriving: History
and Impact, 28 INT. J. CHILDBIRTH ED. 62, 62-67 (2013); Ben Young et al., Effectiveness of Mass
Media Campaigns to Reduce Alcohol Consumption, 53 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 302, 302-16
(2018).
139. See WHITE, supra note 114, at 438, 441. In the 2000s, addiction as a disease became defined
as non-substance-specific and as appearing on a spectrum. Id. at 436.
140. Id. at 305.
141. Act of Nov. 2, 1951, ch. 666, 65 Stat. 767 (repealed 1970).
142. W.H. Lawrence, PresidentLaunches Drive on Narcotics; PresidentOpens War on Drugs;
Names 5 in Cabinet to New Panel, N.Y. TIvtES, Nov. 28, 1954, at 1.
143. Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Star. 651.
144. For a discussion of the ways in which it has become easier for law enforcement officials to
arrest someone for a drug offense in the last decades, see MARKUS D. DUBBER, VICTIMS INTHE WAR
ON CRIME: THE USES AND ABUSES OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS (2002).
145. See SUSAN CHEEVER, DRINKING IN AMERICA: OUR SECRET HISTORY 208 (2015) (discussing
the role of Mothers Against Drunk Driving in "lobb[ying] for higher drinking ages and more severe
punishments for driving drunk").
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noncitizens with criminal records and reduce the availability of defenses
46
to deportation.1
B.

Substance Addiction and Race, Gender, Ethnicity, and Class

Changing views of drug use and addiction have been driven in part by
the social status, ethnicity, gender, and race of users. 147 European colonists
and early white Americans used alcohol as a means of power and control
over Native Americans and enslaved Africans. 148 As a means of ensuring
that Native Americans would remain productive as trappers, colonists
controlled their access to alcohol. 49 At the same time, colonists fostered
a stereotype of male Native Americans as drunks, building a mythology
of Native Americans' supposed innate inability to handle alcohol. 5 ° In a
similar manner, white people used alcohol to exert power and control over
enslaved African men and women. To ensure that alcohol would not
diminish the ability of enslaved men and women to engage in hard labor,
slave owners limited their drinking. 5 ' Slaves owners also used

"controlled promotion of drunkenness" on certain occasions as a form of
domination and degradation. 5 2 Professor Jayesh Rathod argues that
whites' use of alcohol as a means of social control over Native Americans
and slaves laid the groundwork for later negative associations between

146. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
147. See Gregory Y. Mark, Racial, Economic and Political Factors in the Development of
America's FirstDrug Laws, 10 ISSUES CRM. 49 (1975). Levels of the use and abuse of drugs have
also depended in part on their availability, as well as people having time and money to access them.
The role of the United States abroad has affected supply, including U.S. involvement in cocaine and
heroin trafficking as part of its support of anti-communist groups. See DuRRANT & THAKKER, supra
note 113, at 83, 103. The rise of the recreational use of drugs in the twentieth century correlates with
an increase in leisure time and available income. Id. at 92.
148. See WHITE, supra note 114, at 1.
149. See EDWARD BEHR, PROHIBrrION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 17 (2011);

LENDER & MARTIN, supra note 114, at 21-24.
150. See generally PETER C. MANCALL, DEADLY MEDICINE: INDIANS AND ALCOHOL IN EARLY

AMERICA 11 (1995). Literature reflected societal views linking Native Americans with excessive
alcohol use. See Don Coyhis & William L. White, Alcohol Problems in Native America: Changing
Paradigmsand ClinicalPractices,20 ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q., No. 3-4, 157-165 (2002); Beth
Kraig, It's About Time Somebody Out Here Wrote the Truth: Betty Bard MacDonald and
North/Western Regionalism, 40 WESTERN AM. LIT. 237, 260-61 (2005) (discussing the racist
portrayal of Native Americans as drunks in the 1945 popular book The Egg and]).
151. See LENDER & MARTIN, supra note 114, at 27 (discussing how the slave codes forbade
enslaved men and women from purchasing or consuming alcohol without the permission of the
owners).

152. See WHITE, supra note 114, at 1, 12 (discussing Frederick Douglass's analysis of how slave
owners used alcohol in furtherance of slavery); FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY
FREEDOM 254, 256 (1857).
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alcohol and immigrants.153 In his view, the link between anti-immigrant
sentiment and alcohol use was so strong that a driving force behind
Prohibition was the exertion of social control over immigrants, who had
15 4
been painted as alcohol abusers.
Class and gender have also played a role in how addiction is perceived.
Prior to the twentieth century, the typical opium user was a white middleclass woman who had been prescribed the drug by a physician.15 5 In the
early part of the twentieth century, the typical user became a lower-class
man. 5 6 With this change in the demographics of opium use, the drug drew
more stigma.
Racial and ethnic animus is also apparent from the fact that the same
drugs, when associated with different groups, have been perceived and
treated differently. In mid-nineteenth century America, opium smoking
among Chinese immigrants was a communal activity of men and part of
their cultural identity. 157 White society, however, considered opium
smoking-as opposed to its medicinal use in pill form-a dangerous
vice."'58 Reflecting racial animus against the Chinese, laws against opium
59
smoking predated laws against other forms of opium. 1
The negative view of cannabis and cocaine in the early twentieth century
was due in part to their unwarranted association with ethnicity and race,
specifically Mexicans and black Americans. 6 ' White people's association
of black people with drugs may even have given impetus to lynchings.'I6 In
153. See Rathod, supra note 70, at 798-802. Judgmental attitudes about drug and alcohol use were
tied to anti-immigrant sentiment in other ways as well. The eugenics movement at the turn of the
nineteenth century endorsed the idea that alcoholics would be weeded out of the human race as a
matter of natural selection. See WnTE, supra note 114, at 120-22. Proposals such as the involuntary
sterilization of alcoholics were bound up with proposals for restricting immigration. Id. at 121.
154. See Rathod, supra note 70, at 802.
155. See DURRANT & THAKKER, supranote 113, at 81.
156. DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: A HISTORY OF OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA

3 (2001).
157. See DUlRRANT & THAKKER, supra note 113, at 77; ZHENO YANoWEN, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF
OPIUM IN CHINA (2005).

158. Id. (discussing racial animus of whites directed at the Chinese); WttTE, supra note 114, at
148 ("While the dominant profile of opiate addiction was that of the woman addicted to use of opiatelaced medicines, the image of the drug addict was one centered around the Chinese opium dens. The
former was considered to be suffering from a disease, while the latter was viewed as perpetrating a
heathen vice.").
159. Mark, supra note 147, at 61 (describing the first opium offense laws as part of San Francisco's
package of anti-Chinese municipal ordinances).
160. See DURRANT & THAKKER, supra note 113, at 109-10.
161, Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching,Federalism,and the Intersection ofRace andGender in the
ProgressiveEra, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 72 (1995) ("Most alarmingly, some writers spread the
notion that 'most of the attacks upon white women of the South... are the direct result ofa cocain[e]-
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the 1960s, drug use helped form the positive group identity of people
opposed to the Vietnam War and in favor of civil rights-a movement that
encompassed both blacks and whites. 162 The "War on Drugs" declared by
President Nixon in 1971, however, linked drugs to crime and perpetuated
derogatory racial and class stereotypes. 63 The pejorative term "crackhead"
emerged as a thinly veiled racial slur in the 1980s.11 For decades, federal
law punished the use and possession of crack cocaine, which was prevalent
in poor black communities, more harshly than the use and possession of
powder cocaine, which was favored by wealthier white people.165 This stark
discrepancy persisted until 2010, when President Obama facilitated the
passage of the Fair Sentencing Act, which equalized the punishment of
1 66
crimes involving crack and powder cocaine.
C.

Public Perception Today

The public perception of people addicted to crack contrasts sharply
with societal views about drug addiction today, particularly opioid use.
Now, as in the late nineteenth century, opioid use is associated with White
middle-class America. 67 The skyrocketing rate of opioid addiction has
prompted President Trump to describe the "opioid epidemic" as the

crazed negro brain."') (internal citations omitted); see also generally Carl L. Hart, How the Myth of
the 'Negro Cocaine Fiend' Helped Shape American Drug Policy, NATION (Jan. 29, 2014),
https://www.thenation.conmarticle/how-myth-negro-cocaine-fiend-helped-shape-american-drugpolicy/ [https://perma.cc/6VPV-YWTJ]; Desmond Manderson, Symbolism and Racism in Drug
History and Policy, 18 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 2 (1999) (discussing racism in drug history).
162. See KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 83-88 (1997) (noting how race provides the subtext of the politicization of crime
policies); Barry C. Feld, The Transformationof the Juvenile Court-PartI. Race and the "Crack
Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L REV. 327, 367-68 (1999).
163. Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, U. CHI. LEGAL F.25, 52-55 (1994).
164. R. Terry Furst et al., The Stigmatized Image of the "Crack Head": A Sociocultural
Exploration of a Barrierto Cocaine Smoking among a Cohort of Youth in New York City, DEVIANT
BEHAVIOR 20.2, 153-81 (1999); see also MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 4, 97-98 (1995); Autumn Gilbert, The "Crack Head": How Systematic
Inequality
Informs
Popular
Discourse,
MEDIUM
(May
14,
2015),
https://medium.com/@autumngilbert/the-crack-head-how-systematic-inequality-informs-populardiscourse-8e2fSd9eb3eO [https://perma.cc/3GZV-PG4G].
165. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(1I) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (powder cocaine), with id.
§ 841 (b)(1)(A)(iii) (crack cocaine).
166. Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
167. See Andrew Cohen, When Heroin Hits the White Suburbs, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 12,
2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/12/when-heroin-hits-the-white-suburbs
[https://perma.cc/SY9U-HAJ5].
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"worst drug crisis in American history."' 68 As people in positions of
power have experience with addiction in their families and communities,
they have shaped the public discourse about drug use and addiction. 6 9
Today's opioid epidemic, as opposed to the crack epidemic of prior
decades, is viewed by many as a public health crisis rather than a public
safety problem. 17 0
Due in no small part to the struggle of white America with addiction,
the dominant discourse today is that addiction-including both alcohol
and drug addiction-is a medical condition requiring intervention, not a
moral failing. 17' Congressional legislation in the area of healthcare also
reflects the understanding of addiction as a medical condition. The Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008172 requires medical
insurance plans to provide the same coverage for substance use disorders

168. Jenna Johnson & John Wagner, Trump Declares the Opioid Crisis a Public Health
Emergency, WASH. POST
(Oct. 26, 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-polities/wp/201 7/10/26/trump-plans-to-declare-theopioid-crisis-a-public-health-emergency/?utm-term=.58c250d1b88d [https://perma.cc/N3W8HT23].
169. Jeffrey Jones, Americans with Addiction in Their Family Believe it is a Disease, GALLUP
(Aug. 11, 2006), https://news.gallup.com/poll/24097/americans-addiction-their-family-believedisease.aspx [https://perma.cc/G6ME-9JCL] (discussing a survey that polled people with immediate
family member addicted to drugs or alcohol and found that 76% said that addiction is a disease, 81%
said they believed people addicted to alcohol could make a complete recovery).
170. See Matthew Perrone, AP-NORC Poll: Most Americans See Drug Addiction as a Disease,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 5,2018), http://www.apnorc.org/news-media/Pages/AP-NORC-Poll-MostAmericans-see-drug-addiction-as-a-disease.aspx
[https://perma.cc/H77G-2MWP]
(stating the
percentage of people who consider opioid addiction a significant issue for their community increased
from 33% in 2016 to 43% in 2018); ASSOCIATED PRESS-NORC CTR.FOR PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH,
AMERICANS

RECOGNIZE

THE

GROWING

PROBLEM

OF

OPIOID

ADDICTION

(2018),

http://www.apnorc.org/PDFs/Opioids%202018/APNORC-Opioids_.Report_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LNA9-A97T] (noting that the majority of the public views prescription drug
addiction as a disease, and most people surveyed thought it was likely that a person exhibiting the
symptoms of opioid addiction was experiencing a mental illness, suffering from a genetic problem,
or suffering from a malfunction of the brain).
171. Even over a decade ago, 76% of people with an immediate family member suffering from
addiction believed it was a disease. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans With Addiction in Their Family
Believe It Is a Disease: Most Believe Complete Recovery Possible, GALLUP (Aug. 11, 2006),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/24097/americans-addiction-their-family-believe-disease.aspx
[https://perma.cc/F5L7-NK6L]; see also Nat'l Inst. Health, Dep't Health & Human Servs., Biology
of Addiction: Drugs and Alcohol Can Hijack Your Brain, NIH NEWS HEALTH 1-2 (Oct. 2015),
https://newsinhealth.nih.gov/sites/nihNlFlfiles/2015/October/NIHNiHOct2O15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GD3Q-RRLV]; Shaffer et al., supra note 105 (noting how nearly 100% of the repeat
DUI offenders sampled qualified for a lifetime diagnosis of substance abuse disorder).
172. Pub. L. No.110-343, §§ 511-512, 122 Stat. 3765, 3881-93 (2008) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 1185a and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26).
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that is provided for other illnesses.17 3 Recent federal legislation increases
1 74
resources for substance use treatment.
Polls show that Americans increasingly do not support harsh penalties
for unlawful drug use.175 The criminal justice system has taken some steps
to reflect contemporary views, including the decriminalization of
marijuana and the creation of diversion programs and drug courts. 176 For
repeat DUI offenders, federal law encourages states to require
"assessment of the [defendant's] degree of abuse of alcohol and treatment
as appropriate. 1 77
D.

Addiction as a Medical Condition

Despite the late-eighteenth-century roots of the idea that addiction is a
medical condition, this view did not enjoy acceptance in the medical
community until the mid-1950s.'7 8 Only in 1956 did the American
173. Paul Wellstone & Pete Domenici, Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, in
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 511-512, 122 Stat. 3765,
3881-93 (2008) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26); see also id.
§ 512(a)(1), § 712(a)(3)(A) (regulating the financial requirements and treatment limitations that are
applied to both mental health and substance use disorder benefits); id. § 512(a)(4), § 712(e)(5) (adding
a new definition of "substance use disorder benefits").
174. SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271 §§ 7001-8092, 82018222 (2018).
175. See Wilber A. Barillas, Collateral Damage: Drug Enforcement and Its Impact on the
Deportationof Legal PermanentResidents, 34 B.C. J.L. & Soc. JUST. 1, 11, 25 (2014) ("[Mlany
Americans have begun to adopt a more tolerant view of drugs.. This more accepting attitude has
manifested itself in recent state laws.");; Press Release, Poll: Maine Voters Oppose Attorney
General'sPunitive Drug Policies,Support DecriminalizingDrug Possessionand TreatingDrugs as
a Health Issue, DRUG POL'Y ALLIANCE (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.drugpolicy.org/pressrelease/2016/02/poll-maine-voters-oppose-attomey-generals-punitive-drug-policies-support
[https://perna.cc/KM4M-TAXB]; Press Release, New Poll Finds Strong Majority of CA Voters
Believe Too Many People Imprisoned,FavorReducing DrugPossessionPenaltyfrom the Felony to
a
Misdemeanor,
DRUG
POL'Y
ALLIANCE
(Apr.
10,
2011),
http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2011/04/new-poll-finds-strong-majority-ca-voters-believe-toomany-people-imprisoned-favor-reduc [https://perma.cc/ZLU7-VERD]; Ubi Ofer, ACLU Poll Finds
Americans Reject Trump's Tough-on-Crime Approach, ACLU (Nov. 16, 2017, 1:45 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/aclu-poll-finds-americans-reject-tnumps-tough-crimeapproach [https://perma.cc/UU6E-BKCY]. As Professor Nancy Morawetz has observed, past
presidents have admitted to drug use and the use of drugs is so prevalent among the American public
that the Federal Bureau of Investigations no longer regards past drug use as a disqualifier for
employment. Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Drug Inadmissibility,50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 163, 165
(2008) (noting a poll in which "84 percent of voters said that they did not think that proof of cocaine
use in his twenties should disqualify Bush from the presidency").
176. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
177. 23 U.S.C. § 164(a)(5)(B).
178. Agreement in the medical community regarding the disease understanding of addiction is not
total. For an explanation of addiction as a function of social factors, see Gene M. Heyman, Is
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Medical Association formally recognize that physicians must treat alcohol
addiction as a medical issue in their practices.17 9 Not until 1988 did the
group admit the American Society of Addiction Medicine to its ranks. 8 °
In 1972, the National Council on Alcoholism published the Criteria for
the Diagnosis of Alcoholism. 8 ' The first edition of the DSM in 1952
categorized substance use disorder as a personality disorder.'82 In 1980,
the third edition made "substance use disorder" its own category of mental
disorder.183 It was not until the 1980s that most insurance companies included
84
alcoholism as a disease for the purpose of medical insurance coverage.1
Today, the American Society of Addiction Medicine describes
addiction as "a primary, chronic disease of brain reward, motivation,
memory and related circuitry.' ' 185 "Substance use disorder,"
encompassing both alcohol and drug addiction, appears as a mental
medical condition in the DSM. 18 6 The neuroscience of substance use and
addiction has advanced in the last two decades such that neurobiologists
can now point to the processes in the brain that underlie addiction. 187 As

Addiction a Chronic, Relapsing Disease?, in DRUG ADDICTION AND DRUG POLICY: THE STRUGGLE
TO CONTROL DEPENDENCE 81, 81-117 (Philip B. Heyman & William N. Brownsberger eds., 2001).
179. Report of American Medical Association Comm. on Legislation, 162 JAMA 749, 759 (1956).
In 1987, the American Medical Association recognized that addiction is a disease and urged the
development of treatments and policies that recognize this fact. Proceedings of the House of
Delegates, 136th Annual Meeting, at 348 (1987) https://ama.nmtvault.com/jsp/viewer.jspdocid=a
maarch%2FHODOOOO%2F00000061&page..name=34 [https://perma.cc/WM45-UERC]. Today,
numerous treatments exist for substance use disorder. See Deborah A. Dawson et al., Recovery from
DSM-IV Alcohol Dependence: United States, 2001-2002, 100 ADDICTION 281, 289-90 (2005)
[hereinafter Dawson et al., Recovery]; Sean Esteban McCabe et al., Stressful Events and Other
Predictorsof Remission from Drug Dependence in the United States: Longitudinal Results from a
National Survey, 71 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 41, 43 (2016) [hereinafter McCabe et al.,
Stressful Events].
180. See David E. Smith, The Evolution of Addiction Medicine as a Medical Specialty, 13 AM.
MED. ASS'N J. ETHICS 900 (2011).
181. Id. at 384.
182. AM.PSYCHIATRICASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICALMANUAL: MENTAL DISORDERS (1st

ed., 1952). For a chart on the DSM changes, see Sean M. Robinson & Bryon Adinoff, The
Classificationof Substance Use Disorders:Historical,Contextual, and Conceptual Considerations,
6 BEHAV. SCI. 1, 10 tbl.1 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5039518/
[https://perma.cc/EA2V-KJSH].
183. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL DISORDERS (3d

ed., 1980).
184. See WHITE, supra note 114, at 383.
185. Resources: Definition of Addiction,

ASAM:

https:/iwww.asam.org/resources/definition-of-addiction

AM.

SOC'Y

ADDICTION

MED.,

[https:/iperma.cciJVE9-7L7F].

186. See DSM-V, supra note 6, at 483.
187. In 1997, Alan Leshner, a doctor and director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse,
published the influential article Addiction is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278 SCI. 45, 45 (1997).
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the DSM now recognizes, addictive substances affect dopamine levels in
the brain and rewire the brain's reward centers, the result being a deep
craving for the substance. 18 Genetic predisposition to addiction may also
play a role.189 Substance use disorder is treatable and many people achieve
remission.19° Relapse, however, is an integral part of the disease. 19'
Despite the broad medical consensus of addiction as a brain disease,
the fact that substance use has a volitional component, especially at the
beginning, continues to influence how some regard addiction.' 92 Medical
journals discuss the failure of some in the medical community to
understand addiction as a disease needing treatment, as opposed to a
character flaw.' 93
The social acceptance of addiction as a medical condition is not
complete. In 2016, President Obama issued a proclamation during
National Alcohol and Drug Addiction Recovery Month characterizing
addiction as "a disease of the brain" and recognizing that "many
misconceptions surrounding it have contributed to harmful stigmas that
can prevent individuals from seeking the treatment they need."' 94 People
See also Eric J. Nestler, MolecularNeurobiologyof Addiction, 20 AM. J. ADDICTIONS 201 (2001).
188. The DSM-V states: "An important characteristic of substance use disorders is an underlying
change in brain circuits that may persist beyond detoxification, particularly in individuals with severe
disorders." DSM-V, supra note 6, at 483. See also Fran Smith, How Science is Unlocking the Secrets
of Addiction, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 2017), https://www.nationalgeographic.commagazine/201
7/09/the-addicted-brain/ [https://perma.cc/F85G-RJL].
189. David Goldman et al., The Genetics of Addictions: Uncovering the Genes, 6 NATURE REV.
GENETICS 521, 522 (2005).
190. See Dawson et al., Recovery, supra note 179, at 281,289-90; McCabe et al., Stressful Events,
supra note 179, at 43; Robert A. Motano & Stanley F. Wanat, Addiction is a Treatable Medical
Condition, Not a Moral Failing,172 WESTERN J. MED. 63 (2000).
191. See John W. Davison et al., Outpatient Treatment Engagement and Abstinence Rates
Following Inpatient Opioid Detoxification, 25 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 27, 33 (2008); Christian S.
Hendershot et al., Relapse Preventionfor Addictive Behaviors, 6 SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT,
PREVENTION, & POL'Y 17 (2011) (describing recovery as "a dynamic, ongoing process rather than a
discrete or terminal event").
192. See Stephanie Bell et al., Views ofAddictions: Neuroscientists and Clinicians on the Clinical
Impact of a 'Brain Disease Model of Addiction', 7 NEUROETlICS 19, 19, 23-24 (2013); NICK
HEATHER, ADDICTION AND CHOICE: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 66-82 (2017).
193. See, e.g., Matano & Wanat, supra note 190, at 63 ("Despite the fact that it was long ago
acknowledged that alcohol and drug dependency are diseases (the AMA accepted this a quarter of a
century ago), the everyday world of medical practice often reflects the stigmatizing attitudes of
medical personnel .... ); Nora D. Volkow et al., NeurobiologicAdvances from the Brain Medical
Condition Model ofAddiction, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 363, 364 (2016) ("The concept of addiction as
a disease of the brain challenges deeply ingrained values about self-determination and personal
responsibility that frame drug use as a voluntary, hedonistic act.").
194. NationalAlcohol and DrugAddiction Recovery Month, 2016, 81 Fed. Reg. 61973 (Aug. 31,
2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201600541/pdf/DCPD-201600541.pdf
[https:i/perma.cc/ZED3-A9SN].
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with addictions still suffer from stigma fueled by the idea that alcohol and
drug abuse is a shameful choice and a weakness of character rather than a
medical condition needing a public health solution.1 95 But the dominant
discourse surrounding drug and alcohol addiction rejects this view. 9 6
Society is moving away from viewing addiction as a moral failing.
III.

JUDICIAL CONCEPTIONS OF ADDICTION

Courts have struggled to contend with the legal implications of
addiction, especially in light of evolving scientific and societal views.
Some decisions have relied on a view of addiction to justify diminishing
culpability, while others have emphasized the volitional component of
becoming and remaining addicted to justify full responsibility.' 9 7 In
keeping with the latter approach, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a case
involving disability benefits for veterans, held that alcohol addiction
constitutes "willful misconduct."' 9 8
195. NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUGS, BRAINS, AND BEHAVIOR: THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugs-brains-behavior-science-addiction/preface
[https://perma.cc/45GJ-MLFB]; see also Thomas R. Kosten, Addiction as a Brain Disease, 155 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 711, 711 (1998); Alan I. Leshner, Science is Revolutionizing Our View of Addictionand What to Do About It, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1 (1999).
196. See supra notes 167-171 and accompanying text; Justin McCarthy, Substance Abuse Spikes
as
Perceived
Problem,
GALLUP
(Nov.
15,
2017),
US.
Health
https://news.gallup.com/poll/222293/substance-abuse-spikes-perceived-health-problem.aspx
[https://perma.cc/63Y7-3KYB] (noting a survey showing that from 2016 to 2017, the number of
Americans who cited drug/alcohol abuse as the most urgent health problem in the United States
increased from 3% to 14%, which is more than double the previous high).
197. Elizabeth Williams, Proof of Chemical Dependency and Rehabilitative Efforts as Factor in
Sentencing, 51 AM. JURIS. PROOF FACTS 3D 413 (1999, updated Nov. 2018) (surveying court

decisions on sentencing). For discussions of whether criminal law should be modified to take account
of current thinking about addiction, see Patrick Murray, Comment, In Need of a Fix: Reforming
CriminalLaw in Light of a Contemporary UnderstandingofDrug Addiction, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1006
(2013); Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Choice, and Criminal Law, in ADDICTION AND CHOICE:
RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 426, 435 (2017) ("[A]lthough the law's approach is generally

justifiable, current doctrine and practice are probably too unforgiving and harsh."). Addiction or being
under the influence generally does not excuse culpability under the insanity defense. See Jeff Felix &
Greg Wolber, Intoxication and Settled Insanity: A Findingof Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 35 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 172, 172-82 (2007) (stating "courts have generally not upheld
substance-induced psychotic symptoms as providing for an insanity defense when the substance in
question had been taken voluntarily."). The highest court in Massachusetts has ruled that a defendant
who suffers from substance use disorder violated her probation by using drugs, even though relapse
is a part of the rehabilitation process. Commonwealth v. Eldred, 101 N.E.3d 911 (Mass. 2018).
198. See Traynor v. Tumage, 485 U.S. 535, 550 (1988) (finding veterans had "engaged with some
degree of willfulness in the conduct that caused them to become disabled"); cf Montana v. Egelhoff,
518 U.S. 37, 50 (1996) (discussing Montana criminal statute rendering irrelevant evidence of
voluntary intoxication is constitutional given "society's moral perception that one who has voluntarily
impaired his own faculties should be responsible for the consequences").
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In criminal law, there is no consensus on whether addiction counts as a
mitigating or aggravating factor in criminal sentencing. 199 In death penalty
cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Eighth Amendment requires
sentencing courts to consider all facts bearing on the defendant's
character, including addiction.2 "° But in non capital cases, no
constitutional rule requires that addiction be considered as a sentencing
mitigator.2 0 Federal and state rules and practices vary.20 2 Federal
sentencing guidelines forbid courts from calculating a sentencing range
based on addiction.20 3 But pre sentencing reports routinely address
addiction and rehabilitation, and these facts influence sentencing within
the scored guideline range. 2° Even in states that follow the federal

199. For discussions of how neuroscience in general should inform our criminal justice system, if
at all, see Henry T. Greely, Neuroscienceand CriminalJustice: Not Responsibility but Treatment, 56
U. KANS. L. REV. 1103, 1103-04 (2008) ("[A]dvances in neuroscience will change, dramatically, the
criminal justice system, but I expect issues of responsibility to play a small role in those changes.");
Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohan, For the Law, Neuroscience ChangesNothing and Everything, 359
PHIL. TRANSACT. ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON B 1775 (2004); Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility,
andthe Brain, 5 PLOS BIOL. 693 (2007); Stephen J.Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility:A DiagnosticNote, 3 OH4IO ST. J. CRIM.L. 397 (2006).
200. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 475 (2009) (remand for juror consideration of whether
addiction of defendant "was sufficiently serious to justify a decision to imprison him for life rather
than sentence him to death").
201. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991); see also United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d
1106, 1130 (3d Cir. 1991) (defendant not entitled under Eighth Amendment to "individualized
sentencing" in non-capital case such that "mitigating circumstances such as [defendant's] drug
addiction" need not be reflected in his sentence), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2013). Regarding the related, but distinct, question of
whether a person is culpable while voluntarily intoxicated, the Supreme Court has ruled that the
Constitution does not mandate admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication in a criminal trial.
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 50 (relying upon "society's moral perception that one who has voluntarily
impaired his own faculties should be responsible for the consequences"). For a discussion of the view
that intoxication and addiction are voluntary and thus provide no defense to criminal liability based
on intoxication and addiction, see HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL
DIsABILrEs AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 77-191 (1979).

202. See Williams, supra note 197. A study of Spanish courts found that it is routine for evidence
of addiction to be considered a mitigating factor at sentencing. M. Argente et al., Reports of Medical
Experts in Cases of Drug Addiction and Assessment of Mitigating Circumstances by the Court, 21
MED. & L. 793, 793 (2002).
203. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines state that any substance addiction by a defendant "is not a
factor in sentencing." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5HI.4 (emphasis added). Challenges to this
provision of the guidelines have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., United States v. Yates, 918 F.2d 225,
225 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to federal sentencing guidelines for
failure to recognize drug addiction as a mitigating factor); Salmon, 944 F.2d at 1131 (same).
204. See CENTER ON JUVENILE & CRIM. JUSTICE, THE HISTORY OF THE PRE-SENTENCE

INVESTIGATION REPORT 4 (2008), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/the_.history.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RN99-AFGV]; Leanne F. Alarid & Carlos D. Montemayor, Attorney Perspectives
and Decisions on the PresentenceInvestigation Report, 21 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 119 (2010).
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approach, such as Florida, judges can take addiction and people's
management of their disease as reasons to sentence someone at the low
end of the sentencing guideline range.20 5
In the immigration context, disagreement about the legal significance
of scientific advancements, coupled with the traditional low standard of
review often applied in immigration cases,2 °6 make it unlikely that the
judiciary will align immigration law and contemporary understanding of
addiction anytime soon. This reality was apparent in the Ninth Circuit's
2017 en banc, plurality decision in Ledezma-Cosino 11.207
A.

Addiction as MoralFailing. Ledezma-Cosino

The Ninth Circuit's en banc plurality decision in Ledezma-Cosino
reflects the struggle to map current understanding of addiction onto the law.
Despite the wide consensus among the deciding judges that addiction is not
a moral failing, the court nonetheless upheld an immigration provision
saying that it is. Ledezma-Cosino involved an equal protection challenge to
the "habitual drunkard" bar to good moral character in the INA.2 °8 A panel
of the court, composed of Circuit Judges Stephen Reinhardt, Richard R.
Clifton, and District Judge Miranda M. Du, found an equal protection
violation.20 9 The panel held that it was irrational, and thus a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, to categorically preclude habitual drunkards from
showing good moral character. 210 After surveying the scientific consensus
on alcoholism, the panel dubbed "an old trope" the idea "that alcoholics are
blameworthy because they could simply try harder to recover."2' 1 I Finding
no rational relationship between alcoholism and moral character, the panel
ruled the statute unconstitutional.2 12
A plurality of the court sitting en banc on rehearing reversed the
decision.2" 3 Four judges-Susan P. Graber, Richard R. Clifton, Mary H.
Murguia, and John B. Owens-found that Congress could rationally
205. Interview with Andrew Stanton, Assistant Pub. Def., Miami-Dade Cty., Fla. (Feb. 7, 2019).
206. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
207. Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2017).
208. Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch (Ledezma-Cosino1), 819 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2016), rev'den banc
sub nom. Ledezma-Cosino H1, 857 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2017). For a discussion of the habitual drunkard
bar, see supra section I.B.
209. Ledezma-Cosino I, 819 F.3d at 1078.
210. Id. at 1076.
211. Id. ("We are well past the point where it is rational to link a person's medical disability with
his moral character.").
212. Id. at 1078.
213. Ledezma-Cosino 11, 857 F.3d at 1049.
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exclude habitual drunkards because they might pose a danger to others, a
legitimate government interest.2 1 4 But in so doing, these judges declined to
find that it was rational for Congress to legislate that habitual drunkards lack
"good moral character."2 15 To the contrary, the judges indicated that the
good moral character label was "unfortunate, outdated, or inaccurate."2 6
The judges instead ruled against Ledezma-Cosino on the ground that the
"good moral character" designation was irrelevant as an "intermediate
category" that did not require justification. 2 17 The only inquiry was whether
it was rational to deny immigration benefits to habitual18 drunkards as a class
because they could pose a danger to the community.
Three other judges-Alex Kozinski, Carlos T. Bea, and Sandra S.
Ikuta-disagreed with the idea that the "good moral character" language
was irrelevant and reasoned instead that Congress did not even need to
establish a rational basis.2" 9 Citing to the plenary power doctrine, under
which the judiciary exercises little to no review over immigration matters,
these judges found that the proper standard was only whether Congress
had a "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for characterizing habitual
drunkards as lacking good moral character.22 Under this test, the judges
221
found that Congress could exclude Ledezma-Cosino on moral grounds.
But in so doing, they warned that differential treatment of habitual
drunkards in non-immigration contexts, such as public housing or
Medicare, "would be far more problematic. 2 22 Echoing the sentiment of
the first four judges, these concurring judges characterized the equation
of alcoholism with bad character as "foolish. 2 23
214. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit took a similar approach. See Tomaszczuk
v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 2018). In Tomaszczuk v. Whitaker, the court found that the
"habitual drunkard" designation requires a finding of harmful conduct, not just a finding that a person
is an alcoholic. Id. at 165. On that basis, the Court found that it was rational, and therefore not a
violation of equal protection, for Congress to legislate that habitual drunkards cannot show good
moral character. Id.
215. See Ledezma-Cosino II, 857 F.3d at 1048-49.
216. Id. ("The intermediate label is therefore of no constitutional moment, even if we were to agree
that the label is unfortunate, outdated, or inaccurate.").
217. Id. at 1048.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1049 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 1051. This exceptionally low standard of review derives from the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
221. Ledezma-Cosino 11, 857 F.3d at 1051 (Kozinski, J., concurring) ("Congress can exclude
Ledezma on account of a medical condition or it can do so because it considers him immoral."
(emphasis added)).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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Another group of three concurring judges, Judge Paul J. Watford, M.
Margaret McKeown and Richard R. Clifton, filed an opinion on yet a third
ground. For them, it could be rational for Congress to fmd habitual
drunkards morally blameworthy and thus lacking in good moral
character. 224 While acknowledging that "[w]e know considerably more
about alcohol addiction today than we did back in 1952 [when the INA
was passed]," these judges reasoned that science "confirms that, at least to
some extent, there is indeed a volitional component to developing an
addiction to alcohol. 1 25 They found that the question of whether a person
addicted to alcohol has enough free will to make a person morally
226
blameworthy for drinking "is a policy question for Congress to resolve."
Although the en banc court reversed the panel's decision in LedezmaCosino I, the plurality and multiple concurrences underscored the current
consensus that addiction is a medical condition and not simply bad
behavior or a failure of will. Three concurring judges did not believe that
the statute would have survived rational basis review if it had been outside
the immigration context. 227 No judge endorsed the view that being a
habitual drunkard was morally blameworthy, although three judges
believed that it would have been rational for Congress to have legislated
on these grounds.2 28 Only four found that the habitual drunkard bar to
good moral character clearly passed the rational basis test, as opposed to
a lesser standard, and these judges appeared to disapprove of linking being
229
a "habitual drunkard" to morality.
Ledezma-Cosino 11 illustrates that constitutional review in the area of
immigration is unlikely to contemporize the law's view of addiction.2 30
Despite many of the judges' sympathy for delinking morality and
addiction, they upheld the habitual drunkard bar to good moral
224. Id. at 1052 (Watford, J., concurring) ("In my view, Congress could rationally deem habitual
drunkards to be at least partially responsible for having developed their condition.").
225. Id. at 1052-53.
226. Id. at 1053.
227. Id. at 1051 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (stating that it was only "the near limitless power of the
political branches over immigration and foreign affairs that puts the statute here beyond cavil").
228. Id. at 1053 (Watford, J., concurring) ("It has been suggested that Congress' decision to treat
habitual drunkards as lacking in good moral character is irrational because Congress has not classified
individuals suffering from other chronic medical conditions, such as diabetes, heart disease,
and bipolar disorder, as morally blameworthy for their conditions. The mere fact that a classification
drawn by Congress may be underinclusive, however, is not sufficient to render it invalid under rational
basis review.").
229. Id. at 1048-49 (plurality opinion) (suggesting that labeling "habitual drunkard[s]" as lacking
good moral character is "unfortunate, outdated, or inaccurate").
230. The Ninth Circuit had previously rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to the deportation
ground for drug addiction. See McJunkin v. INS, 579 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1978).
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character. 231 This result was due in part to plenary power, as three judges
relied on this doctrine for their concurrence in the decision. 232 Equally
important to the result was the idea, endorsed by three concurring judges,
that science had not yet proven that addicts sufficiently lack volition when
suffering from their medical condition.2 33
The Ninth Circuit's divided decision in Ledezma-Cosino II reflects the
difficulty courts face when trying to contemporize the view of addiction in
case law. Despite the unsettled nature of how the law relates to addiction,
one clear judicial rule from criminal law draws a distinction between the
status of being an addict and acts associated with addiction. Under Supreme
Court precedent, the former cannot be criminalized, whereas the latter
can.2 34 Criminal law thus differs from immigration law, which, as discussed
above, imposes consequences on both the status of suffering from substance
use disorder and the acts associated with the disease.
B.

Status versus Act

In two U.S. Supreme Court cases from the 1960s, Robinson v. State of
23 5 and Powell v. State
California
of Texas,236 the Court addressed whether
the state of being an addict or being in public while under the influence
could be criminalized without running afoul of the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment. In Robinson, the
Court held that the state of California could not criminalize being
"addicted to the use of narcotics. '237 The Court held that the statute at
issue was unconstitutional because it made the passive "status" of drug
addiction illegal, as opposed to a particular "act," such as the use,
purchase, sale, or possession of drugs or disorderly conduct due to drug
use.23 8 Embracing the disease model of addiction, the Court analogized
people addicted to drugs as like being "mentally ill, or a leper,
or... afflicted with a venereal disease."23' 9 The court reasoned that "in the
light of contemporary human knowledge," criminalization of "such a
disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel
231. See Ledezma-Cosino I, 857 F.3d at 1048-49.
232. Id. at 1051 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 1053 (Watford, J., concurring); see also supra note 225 and accompanying text.
234. See infra section [II.B.
235. 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
236. 392 U.S. 514, 531-37 (1968).
237. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660.
238. Id. at 662.
239. Id. at 666.
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and unusual punishment.2' 4 ° Indeed, the attorney for the state of
California had conceded that "narcotic addiction is an illness. 2 4'
Six years later, the Court in Powell confronted the question whether a
Texas statute's criminalization of public intoxication also violated the
Eighth Amendment.24 2 Powell had not disputed that he was an alcoholic
but argued that it was cruel and unusual to punish him because "his
appearance in public (while drunk was) ...not of his own volition. 2 4 3 In
a plurality opinion, the Court ruled against him, distinguishing Robinson
on the ground that "being in public while drunk on a particular occasion"
was punishment for an "act," not punishment for the "status" of being a
chronic alcoholic. 2" The decision rested in part on the "current state of
medical knowledge," which did not show consensus that alcoholics
"suffer from such an irresistible compulsion to drink and to get drunk in
public that they are utterly unable to control their [actions]." 245 The Court
characterized public drunkenness as an "antisocial deed[]" for which
Powell had "moral accountability."2'46 By referencing the "current state"
of science,247 the Court appeared to leave an opening to revise its views in
light of developments in the medical understanding of addiction.248
The tension between the Richardson and Powell decisions has sparked
considerable commentary.24 9 The distinction between the status of being an
addict and the act of appearing in public while under the influence rests on
a slender reed. Powell was a four-to-five decision and the dissenting justices
in Powell would have applied the reasoning of Robinson.250 For the
dissenters, the "essential constitutional defect" in both cases was that the
"defendant was accused of being in a condition which he had no capacity

240. Id.
241. Id.at 667.
242. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-37 (1968).
243. Id. at 517.
244. Id. at 532.
245. Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 535-36; see also id. at 531 (recognizing the "harsh moral attitude which our society has
traditionally taken toward intoxication and the shame which we have associated with alcoholism");
id. ("Anglo-American society has long condemned [alcoholism] as a moral defect").
247. Id.at 535.
248. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court fails to incorporate new science into its
jurisprudence, see Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo'sNest: Why Do Courts Continue
to Rely on Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L. REv. 987 (2002).
249. See Michael Davis, Addiction, Criminalizationand CharacterEvidence, 96 TEx. L. REv. 619,
637-38 (2018); Maria Slater, Is Powell Still Valid? The Supreme Court's ChangingStance on Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 104 VA. L. REv. 547 (2018).
250. Powell, 392 U.S. at 566-70 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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to change or avoid."25' 1 Both the plurality and the dissent in Powell believed
that resolution of the constitutional issue turned on whether the defendant
had a total loss of volition. 2 The plurality found a lack of medical
consensus that alcoholics lose all power to control their actions,25 3 whereas
the dissent thought that the record was sufficiently clear that alcoholism is
a disease that results in total loss of control. 4 In a concurrence, Justice
White stated that he would have joined the dissent, which would have then
formed a majority to invalidate the Texas statute, if Powell had
demonstrated evidence of chronic alcoholism and homelessness. 5
In the years following Powell, some state legislatures reacted to the
decision by decriminalizing public intoxication by statute.2 56 Moreover,
the judiciaries of at least two states struck down public intoxication as
unlawful, notwithstanding Powell. 257 For example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "voluntarily drinking" to apply only
to people who consumed liquor by choice, not to alcoholics. 8 The court
found that the defendant "was no more able to make a free choice as to
when or how much he would drink than a person would be who is forced
to drink under threat of physical violence."25' 9 The court relied on
"advances in man's knowledge of himself and his environment" for its
conclusion. 260 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that
criminal punishment of chronic alcoholics for public intoxication violated
the state's constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual

251. Id. at 567-68.
252. Id. at 534-70.
253. Id. at 522 (plurality opinion).
254. Id. at 562 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 551 (white, J., concurring); see also id. at 554 (stating that Powell had "made no
showing that he was unable to stay offthe streets on the night in question").
256. See David Robinson, Jr., Powell v. Texas: The Case of the Intoxicated Shoeshine Man Some
Reflections A GenerationLaterby a Participant,26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 401,440,453 (1999); Alcoholism
and Intoxication TreatmentAct, UNIFoRM L.COMM'N (providing a table ofjurisdictions wherein the
Uniform
Alcoholism
and
Intoxication
Treatment
Act
has
been
adopted),
https://my.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?conmmunitykey=af688858-dcd8-4760bede-17393b648974&tab--groupdetails (last visited Nov. 17, 2019). Another writer has put the
number of adopting states at "in one form or another... [at] at least 20." Phillip E. Hassman, Validity,
Construction, and Effect of Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, 85 A.L.R.3d 701,
§ 2 (1978).
257. See State v. Fearon, 166 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Minn. 1969) (interpreting the statute as
inapplicable to "involuntary" intoxication); State ex rel Harper v. Zegeer, 296 S.E.2d 873, 875 (W.
Va. 1983) (holding that conviction is precluded by the state constitution).
258. Fearon, 166 N.W.2d at 723-24.
259. Id. at 724.
260. Id.
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punishment.26 ' Citing the fact that "[m]edical experts and professional
groups have concluded that alcoholism is a disease," the court ruled that
"[t]he State has a legitimate right to remove chronic alcoholics from
262
public places, but not to incarcerate them as criminals.
These cases, as well as Powell and the concurrence of judges Paul J.
Watford, M. Margaret McKeown and Richard R. Clifton in LedezmaCosino II, turned on an analysis of whether people who are addicted still
act with at least some free will such that moral condemnation and
culpability can attach. But today's understanding of addiction and the
brain does not fit neatly into this paradigm. As discussed above, we now
know that addiction rewires the circuits in the brain.2 63 It may not destroy
264
volition, at least in most cases, but it alters normal brain functioning.
The question is how to map this more nuanced understanding of addiction
onto the law.26 5
C.

Brain Science and Culpability

The Supreme Court has considered how advancements in
understanding the brain should inform culpability in its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence relating to juveniles and people with
intellectual disabilities. 6 6 In the last two decades, the Court has held that
juveniles and the intellectually disabled cannot be put to death and that
mandatory life sentences for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder

261. Zegeer, 296 S.E.2d at 878.
262. Id. at 873-74.
263. See supra section I.D.
264. See generally Eric Racine, Sebastian Miller & Alice Escande, Free Will andthe BrainDisease
Model of Addiction: The Not So Seductive Allure of Neuroscience and its Modest Impact on the
Attribution of Free Will to People with an Addiction, 8 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1850 (2017) (study
showing that awareness of the effects of addiction on the human brain results in modest decrease in
the extent to which addicted persons are perceived to have free will).
265. For an argument that "a drug addict's choice to use drugs falls into a gray area between
voluntary and involuntary," see Murray, supra note 197, at 1009.
266. Brain science is increasingly being introduced in criminal courts. See Beth Baker, The Biology
of Guilt: Neurosciencein the Courts, 68 BIOSCIENCE 628 (2018); John B. Meixner Jr., Applications
of Neuroscience in CriminalLaw: Legal and Methodological Issues, 15 CURRENT NEUROLOGY &
NEUROSCIENCE REP. 513 (2015). For critiques of this trend, see Georgia Martha Gkotski & Jaques
Gasser, Critiquede L 'utilisationdes Neurosciencesdans les Expertises Psychiatriques:Le Cas de la
ResponsabilitdPinale [Critiqueofthe Use ofNeuroscience in ForensicPyschiatricAssessments: The
Issue of CriminalResponsibility], 81 L'EVOLUTION PSYCHIATRIQUE 434, 444 (2016) ("Although
neuroscientific evidence can provide assistance in the evaluation of penal responsibility by
introducing new determinisms in the behavioural analysis of offenders with mental disturbances, it
does not dispense with the need to define the limits of responsibility and irresponsibility of the
accused.").
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are unconstitutional.26 7 In so holding, the Court emphasized the dynamic
nature of the Eighth Amendment. What counts as cruel and unusual
changes with time according to "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."2 68 Regarding the culpability of
juveniles, the Court found that "developments in psychology
and brain science
continue to show fundamental
differences
between juvenile and adult minds"2 69 and these findings "diminish[]"
children's "moral responsibility."2 7 This holding reflects the principle
that a person need not be rendered entirely out of control of their actions
for their culpability to be diminished.
It remains to be seen whether the Court's jurisprudence regarding the
culpability of children and the intellectually disabled will influence
71
judicial interventions in the area of alcohol and substance addiction.
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been largely irrelevant outside of
the death penalty and life without parole contexts.272 But even if criminal
law advances further in reducing culpability for individuals struggling
with addiction, this evolution would have no direct effect on addictionbased provisions in civil immigration law. 273 Moreover, as demonstrated
by Ledezma-Cosino II, the plenary power doctrine insulates immigration
law from constitutional challenges.27 4 Judicial intervention alone is thus
unlikely to align immigration law with the contemporary understanding
of addiction. To achieve this goal, legislative reform is required.
267. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 460 (2012) (finding that the Eighth Amendment forbids
automatic sentencing to life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide); Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48,48 (2010) (non-homicide juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life without parole);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005) (juveniles cannot be executed); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 304 (2002) (finding that the Eighth Amendment bans death penalty for defendants with
intellectual disabilities).
268. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
269. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
270. Id.at 72.
271. Slater, supra note 249, at 578; Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the
CriminalLaw, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245, 2253 (1992).
272. See Lonnie E. Griffith, Jr., Constructionand Application of Eighth Amendment's Prohibition
of Cruel and Unusual Punishment-U.S. Supreme Court Cases, 78 A.L.R. 2d 1, 16 (2013) ("[T]he
standard of proportionality in noncapital cases is more narrow than in death penalty cases, making a
successful challenge on grounds of proportionality exceedingly rare in noncapital cases."); Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 277-79 (1983) (holding that the Eight Amendment prohibited life without parole
for fraudulent $100 check because was a nonviolent crime, the defendant had only minor prior crimes,
and the sentence was the most severe that could be imposed).
273. The Eighth Amendment does not apply to immigration law, which is civil. Ziglar v. Abbasi,
582 U.S.__ 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1877 (2017).
274. See Ledezma-Cosino 11, 857 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
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CONTEMPORIZING IMMIGRATION LAW

Society in general is moving away from harsh treatment of addiction
and related behavior and toward an understanding of addiction as a
disease rather than a character trait.2 5 However, people suffering from
substance abuse disorder still suffer significant stigma, and there is
persistent disagreement about how addiction-related behavior, including
relapse, should be treated in the criminal justice system.276 Immigration
law still treats addiction as a moral issue and imposes severe
consequences on both the status, and associated behaviors, of addiction.27 7
Immigration law most obviously incorporates an archaic view of
addiction by linking it to immorality in the good moral character
definition. 278 But immigration law also treats people as undesirable on
account of their status as addicts through the drug addiction deportation
and exclusion statutory grounds.2 79 Furthermore, addicts who are
convicted, or who admit the essential elements, of drug possession or
distribution are put in removal proceedings, often with no defense
available to them. 28 ° And, unlike other medical conditions, substance use
disorder is often considered a negative factor in discretionary
determinations. 281 Because these immigration law provisions are not
expressly tied to a moral fitness test, unlike the habitual drunkard
definition, it is difficult to separate the outdated moral justifications from
legitimate concerns about public health and safety. But the history and
severity of these immigration statutes support the view that they are
animated, at least in part, by concerns about the desirability of the
noncitizens in question.28 2 Only one statute requires a showing of harm to
283
others, suggesting that public safety is not the primary concern.
Immigration law should reflect the wide, albeit not total, acceptance in
public and scientific opinion that addiction is a medical condition that
rewires the brain and results in diminished ability to make judgments, not
a character flaw. The status of being an addict should not be regarded as
a moral failing, and addiction-related behavior must be understood in the
275. See supra Part H1.
276. See supra notes 24-26, 192-195 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Part I.
278. See supra section I.B.
279. See supra section I.A.
280. See supra section I.C.
281. See supra section I.D.
282. See supra Part 1.
283. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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context of addiction as a condition of the brain that typically diminishes
culpability. Immigration law should refrain from penalizing people who
suffer from substance use disorder for their status and count the disorder
as a mitigating factor in assessments of addiction-related behavior. While
substance use disorder imposes costs on individuals, their families, and
communities, immigration policy must balance these costs against the
countervailing harms of treating the addiction of noncitizens differently
than that of citizens.28 4
This Part details the harms of immigration law being out of step with
prevailing views and makes suggestions for needed legislative reform.
Addiction-informed amendments to immigration law are unlikely today
because the political climate cultivated by the Trump administration is
requiring pro-immigrant advocates, organizers, and legislators to play
defense against aggressive and sweeping anti-immigrant policies. However,
forward-looking reformers need a guidepost to help position them to take
advantage of future legislative opportunities, building on the interest
convergence generated by reactions to the current opioid epidemic.285
A.

The Harms of Anachronism

The negative consequences of immigration law's failure to incorporate
a modem view of addiction include the devastating and permanent effects
of family separation, harm to our nation's core identity as an egalitarian
society, and perpetuation of the stigmatization of addiction.28 6 Judging
284. See infra section W.A.
285. See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text. Derrick Bell has described how evolution
of social and legal norms depends on interest convergence between dominant and subjugated groups.
See Bell, supra note 34, at 1624 ("[N]o matter how much harm blacks were suffering because of racial
hostility and discrimination, we could not obtain meaningful relief until policymakers perceived that
the relief blacks sought furthered interests or resolved issues of more primary concern.").
286. AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL., URBAN INST., FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE AFTERMATH
OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 27-51 (2010), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication
/28331/412020-Facing-Our-Future.PDF [https://perma.cc/4J45-NDU5]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
JAILING REFUGEES: ARBITRARY DETENTION OF REFUGEES IN THE U.S. WHO FAIL TO ADJUST TO
PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS (2009); SETH FREED WESSLER, APPLIED RESEARCH CTR.,
SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 5 (2011), https://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/

09/ARCReportShattered_FamiliesFULLREPORTNov2O 1Release.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R4Y8-F3FD] (stating the United States deported "397,000 people and detained
nearly that many ....

shatter[ing] families"); Joanna Dreby, The Burden of Deportationon Children

in Mexican Immigrant Families, 74 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 829 (2012); M. Brinton Lykes & Cristina
Hunter, The Psychosocial Impact of Detention and Deportation on U.S. Migrant Children and
Families, 84 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 496, 497-98 (2014) (summarizing research in this area);
Catherine A. Solheim & Jaime Ballard, Ambiguous Loss Due to Separation in Voluntary
TransnationalFamilies, 8 J. FAM. THEORY & REv. 341 (2016); Kalina Brabeck & Qingwen Xu, The
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noncitizens against an anachronistic understanding of substance use
disorder creates an unjustified double standard. On the one hand, addicted
noncitizens, especially people of color, are castigated as bad people and
face deportation for not controlling their substance use.28 7 On the other,
addicted white citizens are typically viewed as suffering from a medical
condition and deserving of treatment, fostering a nativist identity
"grounded in superiority."28' 8 As explained below, this discrimination
based on outdated norms harms not only noncitizens struggling with
addiction but also U.S. citizens and the entirety of our nation.
These harms must be balanced against legitimate reasons that relate to
drug and alcohol use for regulating the U.S. border. Drug and alcohol use
raise concerns about public safety.2 89 But all except one of the existing
immigration provisions operate against people suffering from substance
use disorder without any showing of harm to other people. The only
provision that requires such a showing is the mental defect exclusion
ground for alcoholism, which requires a showing of associated dangerous
behavior. 9 ° While dangerous behavior, such as driving while under the
influence, can harm others, the resulting immigration consequences

Impact of Detention and Deportation on Latino Immigrant Children and Families: A Quantitative
Exploration, 32 HiSP. J. BEHAV. Sci. 341, 352-53 (2010); Robert T. Muller, The TraumaticEffects
of
Forced
Deportation
on
Families,
PSYCHOL.
TODAY
(2013),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/talking-about-trauma/201305/the-traumatic-effects-forceddeportation-families [https://perma.cc/CU44-AMT2]; Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More
Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/201 4/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-datashows.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/6L7F-RZJ4] (providing anecdotes that illustrate the disruption
deportations cause on communities, support systems, and family units).
287. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A PRICE TOO HIGH: U.S. FAMILIES TORN APART BY
DEPORTATION FOR DRUG OFFENSES (June 16, 2015) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A PRICE
Too HIGH] (detailing harsh effects on families of deportations based on drug offenses),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/16/price-too-high/us-families-torn-apart-deportations-drugoffenses [https://perma.cc/SMA2-X9Z2].
288. Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact ofthe Diversity Rationaleon White
Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 481 (2014); see also David Cole, Their Liberties, Our
Security: Democracy and Double Standards, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 290 (2003) (discussing the
pitfalls for democracy of placing lower value on the fundamental fights of noncitizens).
289. See generally TREVOR BENNETT & KATY HOLLOWAY, UNDERSTANDING DRUGS, ALCOHOL
AND CRIME (Mike Maguire ed., 2005); BARRON H. LERNER, ONE FOR THE ROAD: DRUNK DRIVING
SINCE 1900 (2011); see also Redonna K. Chandler, Bennett W. Fletcher & Nora D. Volkow, Treating
Drug Abuse and Addiction in the CriminalJustice System: ImprovingPublic Health andSafety, 301
J. AM. MED. ASS'N 183, 183 (2009) ("Involvement in the criminal justice system often results from
illegal drug-seeking behavior and participation in illegal activities that reflect, in part, disrupted
behavior ensuing from brain changes triggered by repeated drug use.").
290. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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should be proportional to the act and not reflect a judgment that people
suffering from addiction are immoral.29 1
Of course, substance use disorder inflicts other individual and
communal costs, such as increased health care, spread of infectious
disease, overdose deaths, effects on unborn children, domestic abuse,
homelessness, familial stress and financial strain, divorce, parental
neglect, and loss of work productivity. 29 2 While considerable, these costs
must be weighed against the multiple serious harms caused by exclusion
and deportation--costs that are borne by both noncitizens and citizens alike.
This assessment must account for the harm to the nation's civic political
identity. And morality should have no place in the balancing calculus.
Immigration law's strict addiction-related rules on exclusion and
deportation separate families for reasons that are no longer generally
accepted by society. 293 People should not be permanently separated from
their families because they suffer from substance use disorder. The
emotional and financial damage done to people, especially children, as a
result of deportation of a loved one is well-documented.2 94
291. DUIs have increasingly serious immigration consequences. The Board of Immigration
Appeals ruled in February 2018 that driving under the influence is a significant adverse factor for
consideration of bond. Matter of Siniauskas, 27 L & N. Dec. 207, 209 (2018). In October 2019, the
U.S. Attorney General ruled that a person convicted of two DUI offenses is presumptively barred
from showing good moral character, even if the person is not disqualified from having good moral
character as a "habitual drunkard" and even if the person is now rehabilitated. Matter of CastilloPerez, 27 1.& N. Dec. 664, 666-67 (A.G. 2019).
292. ELLEN BOUCHERY ET AL., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG
CONTROL POL'Y, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES
1992
TO
1998
(2001),
http://drogfokuszpont.hu/wpcontent/uploads/kokkeconomic,_costs_usa_90_98.pdf [https://perma.cc/XR3J-45DG]; HENRICK
HARWOOD ET AL., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y, THE
ECONOMIC COSTS OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES 1992-2002 (2004),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/pdf/economiccosts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2MJSMVW); ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM OTHER
VICES, TIMES, AND PLACES (2001) (listing the different types of harms); Henrick Harwood et al., A
Report and Commentaries:Cost Estimatesfor Alcohol andDrug Abuse, 94 ADDICTION 631, 631-35
(1999); Sana Loue, The Criminalizationof the Addictions: Toward a UnifiedApproach, 24 J. LEGAL
MED. 281 (2003).
293. See supra section l.C.
294. See Randy Capps et al., Implications ofImmigrationEnforcementActivitiesfor the Well-Being
of Children in Immigrant Families:A Review of the Literature, MIGRANT POL'Y INST. & URB. INST.,
10, 12-14 (2015), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/implications-immigration-enforcementactivities-well-being-children-immigrant-families [https://perma.cc/CCL3-KELR]; Lauren
Gambino, Orphaned by Deportation:The Crisis ofAmerican Children Left Behind, GUARDIAN (Oct.
15, 2014 7:59 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/15/immigration-boy-reformobama-deportations-families-separated [https://perma.cc/4V6Z-ACAL]; Cindy Y. Rodriguez &
Adriana Hauser, Deportations: Missing Parents, Scared Kids, CNN (Oct. 27, 2013 11:40 AM),
http://www.enn.com/20 13/10/26/us/inmigration-parents-deported-children-left-behind/
[https://perma.cc/L8H4-HYJJ]; Rebecca Sharpless, "ImmigrantsAre Not Criminals": Respectability,
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But the stark difference in the way the law treats citizen and noncitizen
addicts inflicts serious harm beyond that of family separation. In general,
the law views U.S. citizens addicted to alcohol or drugs as deserving of
medical treatment, although many do not receive it. 295 In contrast,
noncitizens in the same position are deported as undesirable. 296 Treating
people addicted to substances differently based on their immigration
status creates cognitive dissonance, the mental discomfort that results
from holding contradictory beliefs.297 This cognitive dissonance ("Why
are noncitizens who are addicted to alcohol or drugs treated differently
than citizens?") encourages feelings of entitlement and superiority as a
means of resolving the dissonance ("This is our nation and noncitizens
need to earn the right to stay here").298 Resolution of cognitive dissonance
might rely on, and reinforce, racial and ethnic stereotypes and biases
("Mexicans are bringing drugs to our country, so we need to deport
Mexicans involved with drugs").2 99

Immigration Reform, and Hyperincarceration,53 HoUS. L. REV. 691, 722-26 (2016).
295. See CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS & QUALITY, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF
NATIONAL FINDINGS 81-97 (2014), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHresults
PDFWHTML2013/Web/NSDUHresults2013.htm [https://perma.cc/7E3T-QCWT].
296. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A PRICE Too HIGH, supra note 287; Vet DeportedBecause
ofFelony Says He Did His Time in Prison,Belongs Back in US, Q 13 Fox (Mar. 27, 2018, 10:43 PM),
https://ql3fox.com/2018/03/27/vet-deported-because-of-felony-says-he-did-his-time-in-prisonbelongs-back-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/L8H4-HYJJ].
297. See Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives
in the US. Immigration System, 26 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 239-40 (2012) (discussing cognitive
dissonance and applying it in context of narratives told in discretionary immigration proceedings)
(citing ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 175-245 (7th ed. 1995), as quoted in Andrew J.
McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 389, 424 (1999) (describing cognitive dissonance as the "state of tension that occurs
whenever an individual simultaneously holds two cognitions... that are psychologically
inconsistent" and how "people are motivated to reduce it")); see generally AM. PSYCHOL. ASs'N,
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Eddie
Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999) (describing the psychological theory of cognitive
dissonance); JOEL COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A CLASSIC THEORY (2007)
(same); LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957) (same).
298. Cf Muneer 1. Ahmad, Beyond EarnedCitizenship, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 257, 273-90
(2017) (describing the societal harm when immigrants are perceived as needing to work off a moral
deficient and "earn" citizenship).
299. See generally Deborah Weissman, The Politics of Narrative:Law and the Representation of
Mexican Criminality, 38 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 141 (2015). Racially disparate impacts of immigration
enforcement are longstanding. See Kevin Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination. The
Racially DisparateImpacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 993, 998
(citing ALFREDO MIRANDE, GRINGO JUSTICE (1987)) (exploring the history of racial disparities in
U.S. immigration law).
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As discussed above, the history of drug and alcohol use is racialized
and the level of stigma that has attached to drug use and addiction varies
depending on who is associated with a particular drug.3"' For example, the
differential treatment of addiction in black and white communities relies
on, and perpetuates, racial bias. In the same way that the failure to
acknowledge a system of privilege for white people thwarts the
development of a nonracist white identity, gross double standards for
noncitizens make it more difficult for us to develop a non-xenophobic
national identity.30 '
The failure of immigration law to embrace a contemporary
understanding of addiction stands in the way of healthy, egalitarian
identity formation of U.S.-bom citizens. By encouraging people to resolve
the cognitive dissonance in invidious ways, the double standard stymies
the development of a civic national identity that is free from ethnic, racial,
and nationalist animus. This phenomenon not only harms the disfavored
group, but also society at large.
Our democracy suffers when egalitarian norms fail to guide how people
regard and treat one another. Racial and ethnic animus stokes conflict
between groups of people and undermines social solidarity. As is the case
today, white nationalism and nativism begin to rise.30 2 While the harms of
an anti-egalitarian national identity affect us all, the negative effects are
experienced most by the noncitizens themselves, their families, and nonwhite citizens, including those who share ethnic heritage with the groups
of noncitizens most associated with addiction and drug use. 30 3 For
example, viewing drug addiction of Mexicans living in the United States
as a reason to deport them promotes the belief that the substance use
disorder of Mexican-Americans must also be morally blameworthy.
Although Mexican-Americans cannot be deported, their addiction, as

300. See supra section 11B.
301. See James, supra note 288, at 450.
302. See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, Government by White NationalismIs Upon Us, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2017,
6:00 AM), http ://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitics/cover__story/2017/02/govemment-bywhitenationalismjis_upon.s.html [https://perma.cc/XU7F-5KKH]; Hate Groups Increase for
Second Consecutive Year as Trump Electrifies RadicalRight, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/02/15/hate-groups-increase-second-consecutive-year-trumpelectrifies-radical-right [https://perma.cc/HRL9-DZQF].
303. Commentators have observed how stigma attaches not only to noncitizens but those citizens
of the same ethnicity. See, e.g., Daniel I. Morales, It's Timefor an ImmigrationJury, 108 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 36, 42 (2013) ("Mass deportation stigmatizes all Latinos in the same way that mass
incarceration stigmatizes all African Americans."); Weissman, supra note 299, at 148 (discussing the
"Mexican-as-criminal narrative").
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opposed to that of White Americans, is more readily regarded as a failure
of will to which blame can attach.3°4
A further harm of immigration law's endorsement of substance use
disorder as a moral failing is that it perpetuates the traditional stigma
against those who experience the disorder, making it less likely that all
sufferers, including citizens, will receive treatment." 5 People suffering
from substance abuse are often not identified and treated.3" 6 Studies show
that "[a]pproximately 1 in 5 outpatients seeking primary care and 1 in 4
hospital patients are dependent on alcohol; yet, only about 1 in 7 people
who are dependent on alcohol are ever treated."3 7 Immigration law's
tethering of addiction to morality further stigmatizes addiction, thus
discouraging all people, citizen or not, from seeking treatment.
B.

A Reform Proposal

This Part details a proposal for five legislative reforms of immigration
law to help align it with the contemporary understanding of substance use
disorder. Immigration law should reflect the established view that being
addicted is a medical condition, not a failure of will or a defect in moral
304. David Cole has cautioned that "what we do to aliens today provides a precedent for what can
and will be done to citizens tomorrow." Cole, supranote 288, at 304. Although he was discussing on
infringements on the fundamental rights of noncitizens in the context of national security, his insight
also applies to other contexts in which noncitizens are treated under an unjustified double standard.
See also Kevin Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic
Mirror" Into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1148-58 (1998) (describing how "racial
exclusions in the immigration laws reinforce the subordinated status of minority citizens in the United
States").
305. See supra notes 194-195 and accompanying text; Shankar Vedantam et al., Social Stigma is
One Reason the Opioid Crisis is Hard to Confront, NPR (Oct. 31, 2018, 5:00 A.M.),
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/31/662009650/social-stigma-is-one-reason-the-opioid-crisis-is-hardto-confront [https://perma.cc/27WQ-D3A6].
306. Matano & Wanat, supranote 190, at 64.
307. Id. at 63 (citing R.A. Matano & A.B. Bronstone, Assessment, Intervention, and Referral of
PatientsSufferingfrom Alcoholism, 14 J. CARDIOPULMONARY REHABILITATION 27, 27-29 (1994)).
See also CTR. FOR BEHAV. HEALTH STAT. & QUALITY, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES (2016),

https://www.samhsa.gov/data/report/results-2016-national-survey-drug-use-and-health-detailedtables [https:i/perma.cc/3CXH-GJ3D] (finding only one in ten people with a substance use disorder
will receive any type of specialty treatment); OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., FACING ADDICTION IN AMERICA: THE SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ALCO

HOL, DRUGS, AND HEALTH ES 3 (2016), https://avanteibogaine.com/wpcontentluploads/2016/12/sur
geon-general-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9M2-YGVW];
REBECCA AHRNSBRAK ET AL.,
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND MENTAL
HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 20l6 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG

USE AND HEALTH (2017), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FFR12016/NSDUH-FFRI-201 6.htm [https://perma.cc/89H7-CUDF].
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character. Science tells us that addiction is a powerful force that exerts
significant control over human behavior by inducing an altered brain state.
Addiction need not be entirely outside of an individual's control to
disqualify it as a basis for immigration consequences, or at least harsh
ones.3 °8 The reforms suggested below embody the principles that the
status of being an addict should have no immigration consequences and
the immigration consequences for addiction-related harmful behavior
should be proportional to the harm to others.3 09 The grounds for addictionrelated exclusion or deportation should not outweigh the individual and
societal harms of denying people entry or expelling them.3" 0 Even if
someone falls within a ground of deportation or exclusion, the law should
generally provide an opportunity for relief, such as a waiver of
deportation, that nullifies the removal of the particular person based on an
individualized analysis. Discretionary adjudication involves assessment
of the underlying context of negative behavior, weighing the negative
against the positive, and balancing the impact of deportation against that
of the person being able to remain." Addiction-informed adjudication
requires an understanding of relapse as an inherent part of rehabilitation
and of the connection between addiction and criminal activity, like driving
while intoxicated and drug-related offenses. 3 2 Addiction should be
regarded like other types of illnesses in discretionary adjudications.
Reflecting these principles, Congress should amend immigration law to
(1) abolish the habitual drunkard bar to good moral character; (2) repeal
the deportation ground for drug addiction; (3) amend the addiction ground
of inadmissibility to require a showing of a pattern of harm to others; (4)
reduce the harsh consequences of criminal behavior stemming from
substance use; and (5) reinstate the discretionary power of immigration
judges to halt deportations.
1.

Repeal the "HabitualDrunkard"Bar to Good Moral Character

Today's immigration law and practice is misaligned with the prevailing
scientific and social views of alcohol and drug addiction in numerous
ways, some of which are more apparent than others. The express tethering
of the excessive use of drinking to good moral character through the

308. See Volkow et al., supra note 193, at 363.
309. For a discussion of how proportionality is embedded in immigration law, see supra note 27.
310. These harms are discussed in section W.A.
311. See Matter ofMarin, 16 1.& N. Dec. 581,584-85 (BIA 1978).
312. See supra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
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"habitual drunkard" designation is the most obvious example. 3 13 Even the
Ninth Circuit judges who defended this statute as rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose in Ledezma-Cosino II declined to endorse
the view that the excessive use of alcohol reflected on one's moral
character.3 14 The reforms needed to update immigration law include
legislating what the Ninth Circuit in Ledezma-Cosino I] did not feel it
could do judicially under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution-namely, eliminating the habitual drunkard good moral
3 15
character bar.
2.

Repeal the DrugAddiction Ground ofDeportation

But reforms should not be limited to the good moral character
definition. The deportation ground for drug addiction, which has existed
since 1952, should also be repealed. As discussed above, this statute
permits deportation of a person in lawful status, including a longtime
permanent resident, based solely on the fact that they suffer from
substance use disorder. 3 16 When Congress first passed the addiction
ground of deportation, President Franklin D. Roosevelt vetoed it, stating
that drug addiction is "a lamentable disease rather than a crime.- 317 When
this deportation ground was proposed again in 1952, there was opposition
to it during the Congressional hearings. 318 This opposition was grounded
in the core belief that noncitizens who develop addiction are entitled to
the same care and concern that U.S. citizens would receive. Perhaps
reflecting this understanding, and the difficulty of locating people with
addictions in the absence of a criminal record, the addiction deportation
ground is rarely invoked today.319 Congress should now remedy the
mistake it made over six decades ago and eliminate the drug addiction
ground of deportation.3 20

313. See supra section IB.
314. See supra section llI.A.
315. Id.
316. See supra section I.A.
317. Veto of H.R. 6724, 76th Cong., (3d Sess. 1940); Message from the President, H. Doc. No.
689, 76th Cong. (3d Sess. 1940).
318. See, e.g., OSCAR M. TRELLES, HI& JAMES F. BAILEY, II, lMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY

ACTS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, 1950-1978, at 679 (1952) (testimony of
Gustav Lazarus, Ass'n of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers).
319. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
320. An amendment short of repealing the deportation ground would be to tether the definition of
addiction to the DSM.
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Amend the Addiction Grounds ofExclusion to RequirePattern of
Harm to Others

While drug addiction may legitimately give rise to a medical ground of
exclusion, the status of being an addict alone should not make a person
inadmissible. The drug addiction exclusion should only apply to addicts
who have a pattern of harming others. Under current law, any person
considered a drug "abuser" or "addict" will be denied admission, even if
they pose no threat.3 21 Since protection of the public is the primary
impetus behind the grounds of exclusion, 22 addicts that pose no threat to
others should not be excluded. Currently, a wide array of other types of
behavior disqualify people from immigrating, including harm to oneself,
psychological harm to others, property damage, and threats to health or
safety that did not result in harm.323 The drug addiction ground of
inadmissibility should be amended to require a pattern of harmful
behavior that has resulted in actual injury to other people, not property or
the immigrants themselves, for immigrants to be considered inadmissible.
Unlike the drug addiction ground, the alcohol ground requires both3 24a
finding of a "mental disorder" and associated harmful behavior.
However, civil surgeons, including those who examine people for U.S.
consular interviews abroad, are given discretion to determine whether the
"mental disorder" of alcohol addiction is accompanied by sufficiently
harmful behavior.3 25 As a result, some civil surgeons might consider one
DUI conviction sufficient to render a person inadmissible as an alcoholic,
while others require a showing of multiple DUIs. The law should specify
that only a pattern of harmful behavior to others, not property, is relevant.
And only convictions, not arrests that fail to result in convictions, should
figure into the harmful behavior analysis. An arrest does not denote
criminal culpability, as guilt under our criminal justice system must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.3 26 Moreover, studies have documented
the ways in which police stops are racially motivated.32 7
321. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2012).
322. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
323. CDC, TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 54.
324. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I-I) (barring admission of people who have a mental disorder
and behavior associated with the disorder may, or has, posed threat of harm).
325. CDC, TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 54.
326. See Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 304 (1880).
327. See Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1996); Radley Balko, There's
Overwhelming Evidence That the CriminalJustice System is Racist. Here's the Proof, WASH. POST

(Sept.
18,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/1 8/theresoverwhelming-evidence-that-the-criminal-justice-system-is-racist-heres-the-proof/
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Reduce Harsh Consequences of CriminalBehavior Related to
Substance Use

As discussed above, addiction-related criminal behaviors, including the
possession and sale of drugs, result in harsh immigration consequences.32 8
The criminal grounds of inadmissibility and deportation relating to
possession and sale should be made less severe and simplified. Prior
scholarly work argues that no one should face removal unless they have
actually served five years of prison time for a criminal offense and that
discretionary waivers should be restored for those placed into removal
proceedings.3 29 Such reform would go a long way toward dialing back the
immigration consequences for addicts, as only a limited number are likely
to have served five years for an offense and all would be eligible to make
individual cases for discretionary relief before an immigration judge.
A more limited reform directed only at ameliorating harsh results for
people with drug addiction would distinguish between drug crimes related
to addiction and those related to drug dealing for substantial profit. As
described above, current law treats people who sell a small quantity of
drugs to sustain a drug addiction the same as people who sell drugs as a
business.3 3 Both types of sale are aggravated felonies.3 31 The sale of small
amounts of drugs by addicts should not trigger removal or, at the very
least, should not be characterized as an aggravated felony, which bars all
discretionary relief.33 2 The task of distinguishing between addictionrelated sale and commercial sale would fall to immigration adjudicators.
While such adjudications depart from the traditional "elements test" used
to determine whether an offense falls within the federal removal ground,
[https://perma.cc/5BVW-J2DG].
328. See supra section I.C.
329. Rebecca Sharpless, ClearandSimple Deportation Rules for Crimes: Why We Need Them and
Why It's Hardto Get Them, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 933 (2015). Current law results in deportation and
exclusion for crimes that relatively minor. See supra section I.C.
330. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
331. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342-7349, 102 Stat. 4469, 4469-73
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1228, 1252(a)(2)(C) (2012
& Supp. H 2015)); see, e.g., Ghebregziabiher v. Mukasey, 304 F. App'x 288, 290 (5th Cir.
2008) (unpublished) (removal for unlawful and knowing delivery of less than one gram of cocaine by
actual transfer); see also NORTON TOOBY & JOSEPH JUSTIN ROLLIN, EVOLUTION OF THE DEFINITION
OF AGGRAVATED FELONY, http://nortontooby.com/pdf/FreeChecklists/EvoAggFelonyStatute.pdf

[https://perma.cc/9QLP-YVUG].
332. This proposal includes both the ground of inadmissibility and the ground of deportation. As
discussed above, the ground of inadmissibility does not even require a conviction, just admission to
the essential elements of a drug offense. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I1). This ground is
incorporated into the good moral character definition by reference. See U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1) (crossreferencing (a)(2)(A)(i)(1l)).
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this departure is warranted to protect addicts from being deported due to
behaviors bound up with their illness.3 33
Simple drug possession, whether or not tied to addiction, should not
even be a ground of deportation or exclusion. Professor Nancy Morawetz
has demonstrated how societal attitudes toward drug use have changed in
the last decade.33 4 Our drug removal grounds should be amended to reflect
the prevalence and social acceptance of drug use. Past use of drugs is no
longer viewed as disqualifying behavior for the presidency.33 5 Periodic
drug use is socially acceptable and does not pose a threat to public safety,
or at least one that would justify permanent banishment, or exclusion,
336
from the United States.
5.

Reinstate Meaningful DiscretionaryReview

If, after application of the rules outlined above, a noncitizen addict is
still removable, the law should provide for a discretionary waiver and
instruct adjudicators to regard addiction in the discretionary calculus as
3 37
an illness or disability-a positive factor that is relevant to hardship.
Adjudicators should also be trained on how resistance to rehabilitation is
part of the disease and how relapse is an integral aspect of the process of
recovery.33 8 While Alcoholics Anonymous is a well-known recovery
program, it represents just one approach to recovery, and critics have
questioned its methods and outcomes. 33 9 And judges and other

333. For a discussion of the categorical approach to analyzing the immigration consequences of
crimes, see Alina Das, The ImmigrationPenaltiesof CriminalConvictions:ResurrectingCategorical
Analysis in ImmigrationLaw, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1669 (2011); Rebecca Sharpless, Towarda True
Elements Test: Taylor and the CategoricalAnalysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 979 (2008).
334. Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking DrugInadmissibility,50 WM. &MARY L. REv. 163, 194 (2008)
("For adults with a high school education who have reached age forty-five, the statistics show that 79
percent had tried marijuana by the time they turned forty-five and 72 percent had tried an illicit drug
other than marijuana. Almost nine out of ten had tried either marijuana or another drug.").
335. Id. at 165.
336. See supra note 175 and accompanying text; Christopher Ingraham, 11 Charts that Show
Marijuana has
Truly
Gone
Mainstream,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
19,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/04/19/1l 1-charts-that-show-marijuana-hastruly-gone-mainstream/[https://perma.cc/X5EW-9VVH].
337. In re K-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 661, 662 (BIA. 2004).
338. See supranotes 185-191 and accompanying text.
339. See generally LANCE DODES & ZACHARY DODES, THE SOBER TRUTH: DEBUNKING THE BAD

SCIENCE BEHIND 12-STEP PROGRAMS AND THE REHAB INDUSTRY (2014) (pointing to low AA success
rate of 5% to 10% and criticizing the science behind AA's twelve-step program).
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adjudicators must understand that the stress of being in an immigration
proceeding can aggravate the disease of addiction.34
As discussed above, virtually no discretionary relief exists in
immigration law today and, when relief is available, judges have no clear
instruction on whether to count addiction as a negative, positive, or neutral
factor when making discretionary decisions.34 1 The lack of guidance
surrounding the significance of addiction in a balancing test leaves people
suffering from addiction at the mercy of particular judges' attitudes
toward it. The law should make clear that addiction is a medical condition
that, like other medical conditions, should typically count as a positive
factor in a discretionary calculus.
V.

CONCLUSION

Immigration law's failure to align with contemporary understanding of
alcohol and drug addiction undermines immigration law's moral authority.
The judiciary is unlikely to correct the misalignment through constitutional
review. Multiple provisions of the INA attach immigration consequences to
being addicted to alcohol or a drug. Noncitizens suffering from addiction
can be deported, excluded from entry, and denied U.S. citizenship. These
harsh results might make sense in a world in which addiction is condemned
as an "antisocial deed[]" for which addicts have "moral accountability."34' 2
Judged by today's sensibilities, however, these addiction-related provisions
are as anachronistic as the former statutes that prevented the entry of people
3 43
for being gay or suffering from epilepsy.
Deportations lead to the devastating and lasting ruin of families. The
integrity and legitimacy of our entire immigration enforcement regime
suffers when the government deports people for reasons not generally
viewed as justified. Given our nation's fundamental value of equality, any
double standard erodes our commitment to equality. Thus, treating citizen
addicts differently than noncitizens damages our national identity as an
egalitarian society.
340. See Rajita Sinha, Chronic Stress, Drug Use, and Vulnerability to Addiction, 1141 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 105, 105-30 (Oct. 2008); Sarah E. Richards, How Fearof DeportationPuts Stress
on Families, ATLANTIC (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2017/03/depor
tation-stress/520008/ [https://perma.cc/GH9R-TD7N].
341. See supra sections I.C. and I.D.
342. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968); see also id. at 531 (recognizing the "harsh
moral attitude which our society has traditionally taken toward intoxication and the shame which we
have associated with alcoholism"); id. ("Anglo-American society has long condemned [alcoholism]
as a moral defect.").
343. See supranotes 16-17, 49-51 and accompanying text.
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Legislative reform is all the more urgent in view of how dominant
groups have manipulated laws, practices, and perceptions relating to drugs
and alcohol as a means of subjugating others based on invidious grounds.
History teaches that alcohol and "drugs emerge as scapegoats on which
racial fears and prejudices can be expediently hung." 3" This troubling
history further undercuts any claim that the United States can legitimately
deport and exclude people suffering from addiction.3 45
Conforming immigration law to prevailing norms requires the
elimination of certain grounds of exclusion and deportation, as well as the
"habitual drunkard" bar to good moral character. No one should be
deported or denied entry for suffering from either drug or alcohol
addiction. Possession of small amounts of drugs should not be a ground
of removal, and sale of small amounts that relate to sustaining an addiction
should either not trigger deportation or should be waivable through a
discretionary waiver. Only when a person addicted to alcohol or drugs has
posed a danger to society should immigration law impose a consequence.
Even then, immigration judges should have the discretion to adjudicate
whether deportation is appropriate on a case-by-case basis.
Popular opinion and advances in brain science have resulted in
advancements in the criminal justice system with respect to addiction and
addiction-related behavior. The time has come for Congress to do the
same for immigration law. We no longer live in a society in which we
simply castigate our family members, friends, and community members
who struggle with substance use disorder. Today, we have a more robust
and data-driven understanding of the effects of substances on the human
brain. We must extend this enlightened understanding to all, not just to
some. Our commitments to equality and human dignity demand that we
delink morality from addiction and understand addiction as a disease that
mitigates culpability, including in immigration law.
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